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THE NORTH DAKOTA GARRISON DIVERSION
PROJECT AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

CHARLES M.

CARVELL*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since construction began on North Dakota's massive water
project, the Garrison Diversion Unit (GDU), opposition to it has
been vociferous. Based primarily on environmental considerations,
criticism has come from individual citizens,' organizations, 2 and
4
the governments of Canada 3 and Manitoba.
International environmental law has been rarely referred to in
the GDU debate, with the exception of repeated invocations,
particularly by the project's Canadian antagonists, of the United
States-Canada 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.3 On the whole,
international law has been neglected even though its environmental
concepts are relevant to the development of North Dakota's water
project.
* B.A. 1975, Jamestown College; J.D., 1978, University of North Dakota; LL.M., 1979,
Universitv College, University of London; Associated with Hjellum, Weiss, Nerison, Jukkala,
Wright & Paulson, Jamestown, N.D., 1980-1982; Ph.D. candidate in Public International Law,
University of Edinburgh. The author is grateful for the assistance of Murray Sagsveen and Gary
Hcgcson who supplied a number of documents concerning Garrison Diversion.
I. See G. SHERWOOO, NEW WOUNDS FOR OLD PRAIRIES (1972).
2. Some ofthese organizations include the National Audubon Society and the Sierra Club at the
national level, the Committee to Save North Dakota at the state level, and the Committee to Save
Sttsman County at the local level.
3. Nossal, The Unmaking of Garrison: United States Politics and the Management of Canadian-American
Ikundarv hlaters, 37 BEHIND THE HEADLINES 1, 4 (1978).
4. Id. at 6.
5. Boundary Waters Treaty,Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Canada, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548.
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A short review of Garrison Diversion's history and the
Canadian environmental objections to it comprise the first part of
this Article. Thereafter, an overview is presented of two aspects of
international law. First, substantive international environmental
law is inspected. Second, a survey is made of international
procedural law relevant to an activity having possible harmful
effects for an international drainage basin. 6 The Article concludes
with a few remarks about the United States' conformity with this
substantive and procedural law.
II. THE GARRISON DIVERSION PROJECT
A.

A

SYNOPSIS

OF

THE

GARRISON

DIVERSION

PROJECT'S

HISTORY AND FUNCTIONING

The idea of diverting water from the Missouri River to benefit
North Dakota was considered in 1889 by the state Constitutional
Convention 7 and calls for a state water project were stimulated by
the drought and depression of the 1930s.8 The first step toward this
goal was passage of the 1944 Flood Control Act by the United
States Congress, 9 which called for a comprehensive development
program for the Missouri River Basin. 10 A primary purpose of the
Act was elimination of downstream flooding on the Missouri River,
to be partially achieved by damming the river in North Dakota
near the town of Garrison. 1
In return for its consent to construction of Garrison Dam,
North Dakota demanded and received assurances from Congress
that it would receive a multi-purpose water project as compensation
for the 550,000 acres of North Dakota land that would be
12
inundated by Garrison Dam.
In 1957, the year after Garrison Dam was completed,' 3 the
6. "International drainage basin" has been defined as "a geographical area extending over two
or more States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and
underground waters, flowing into a common terminus." INT'L LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF THE FIFTYSECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI 484-85 (1967).
7. Statement of Major General C. Emerson Murry for the State of North Dakota and the
Garrison Diversion Conservancy District, SPECIAL REPORT ON NORTH DAKOTA'S PLAN FOR PHASE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT 1, 7 (U.S. Dep't of the Interior Water and Power
Resources Service Upper Missouri Region (1981)) [hereinafter cited as Murry].
8. See Nossal, supra note 3, at 1.
9. Murry, supra note 7, at 7. For a review of the studies, politics, and negotiations that preceded
approval of the 1944 Flood Control Act, see M. LAWSON, DAMMED INDIANS: THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN
ANt THE MISSOURI RIVER SIOUX, 1944-1980, at 9-26 (1982).
10. See G. SHERWOOD, supra note 1, at 15. The Flood Control Act called for the construction of'
137 dams, production of hydroelectric power, and irrigation of more than 10 million acres. Id.
11.Murry, supra note 7, at 7.
12. GARRISON DIVERSION CONSERVANCY DIST., RECLAMATION FROM 1902, at 6 (pamphlet
(listributed by the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District).
13. GARRISON DIVERSION CONSERVANCY DIST., GARRISON DIVERSION MEANS. ..
WAIER
(pamphlet distributed by the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District).
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Bureau of Reclamation completed a plan for the North Dakota
GDU that would give the state a water project. 14 Although this plan
went through several revisions it served as the basis for the 1965
congressional authorization of the GDU. 15
The GDU will divert water from the lake formed by Garrison
Dam and Lake Sakakawea to central and southeastern North
Dakota.
The project is primarily intended to provide
supplementary water supplies to fourteen communities and four
industrial areas and to provide for fish and wildlife conservation,
recreation, and flood control. Furthermore, 250,000 acres are to be
irrigated by the diverted waters.
The process of diversion begins at the Snake Creek Pumping
Plant, which will lift water from Lake Sakakawea and deposit it into
Lake Audubon. The water will then flow seventy-three miles
through the McClusky Canal to the Lonetree Reservoir, the
principal storage and regulatory facility of the project. An extensive
system of rivers and man-made canals will carry the water in three
directions to various irrigation areas and communities. The Velva
Canal will extend northward from Lonetree Reservoir and move
water to the Souris River area. The New Rockford Canal and its
extension, the Warwick Canal, will transport water eastward for
use in the New Rockford and Warwick-McVille areas. In addition,
the New Rockford Canal will feed the James River, which in turn
conveys GDU waters to the Oakes-LaMoure area, the southern
section of the project.
B.

CANADIAN

OBJECTIONS

TO

THE

GARRISON

DIVERSION

PROJECT

Construction of the GDU began in 1967,16 and soon questions
and complaints about the project were voiced. 17 Protests by
14. G. SHERWOOD, supra note 1, at 16.
15. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, TRANSBOUNDARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT 1

(1977). For a general description of the project, see id.at 11-15; G. SHERWOOD, supra note 1, at 1516; and GARRISON DIVERSION CONSERVANCY DIST., supra note 13. These works are the source of the

infitrmation in the following two paragraphs of the text.
16. 1 DEP'T OF INTERIOR, GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT FINAL COMPREHENSIVE SUPPLEMENTARY
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, 1-2 (1979). To date about 20% of the 1965 authorized project is
(.oIplete. Fargo Forum, Aug. 19, 1984, at D5, col. 1. Completed aspects of the GDU include the

Snake Creek Pumping Plant, McClusky Canal, and Wintering Dam, one of the two dams that will
fortt Lonetree Reservoir. Work is presently progressing on Lonetree Dam. Letter from H.
Englehorn, Manager, Garrison Diversion Conservancy District, to the author (Sept. 9, 1983) (on file
with I he author).
17. Other than Canadian concerns, which are the focal point of this article, some aspects of the
irc jc' questioned by its American opponents include its cost/benefit ratio, its damage to and

destruction of wildlife habitats and refuges, its appropriation of farmland for waterways and for
mitigation of'damage caused to wildlife areas, and the manner in which such acquisition has been
'otluted. H. HUGHES, WATER RESOURCES PROJECTS: GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT, NORTH DAKOTA 3
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America's northern neighbor began as early as 1969.18 Canada
fears that the project will detrimentally alter the quality and
quantity of the fish life in Canadian waters. 19 The GDU crosses the
Continental Divide and, because most of the project is located in
the Hudson Bay Drainage Basin, 20 the greater part of its return
flows 21 will enter transboundary streams. 2 2 The remaining return
flows will flow into the Missouri River Drainage Basin of the
United States.
The most important United States response to Canadian
concerns was its 1975 agreement with Canada to refer the issue to
the International Joint Commission (IJC), a United States-Canada
body established by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty to study and
settle boundary disputes between the two countries. 23 The
reference to the IJC requested it to "examine into and to report
upon the transboundary implications of the proposed completion
and operation of the Garrison Diversion Unit in the State of North
Dakota.
",24 A technical body, the International Garrison
Diversion Study Board (Study Board), was set up by the JC 21 to
examine the project. Based on the Study Board's findings 26 the IJC
(Apr. 6, 1983) (paper of the Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Environment and
Natural Resources Policy Division, Brief No. MB82249); NAT'L AUDUBON Soc'Y, FACT SHEET ON
GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT: NORTH DAKOTA 1 (May 1981).
18. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, INTERNATIONAL GARRISON DIVERSION STUDY BOARD REPORT 2 (1976).
19. INT'L.JOINT COMM'N, supra note 15, at 1-2.
20. "INlearly 87 percent of the irrigation acreage of the 250,000 authorized Garrison Diversion
Unit and over 70 percent of the 'potential municipal water users' are located within the Hudson Bay
Basin." Letter from G. Peterson, North Dakota Chapter of the Wildlife Soc'y, reprinted in Final
Supplemental Environmental Statement on Features of the Garrison Diversion Unit for Initial
1)tvclopment of 85,000 Acres V- 174, V- 178 (Bureau of Reclamation, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Wildlife Soc'y Letter].
21. Return flows are "flows which accrue to streams from irrigation, conveyance system
seepage, operational waste, municipal and industrial users, and fish and wildlife areas as a result of
operating of the GDU." INT'L JOINT COMM'N, supra note 18, at 198. The Garrison Diversion
Conservancy District, the body managing the GDU, has issued a pamphlet which also defines return
flows and discusses the return flow issue from the perspective of GDU proponents. See GARRISON
DIVERSION CONSERVANCY DIST., GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT RETURN FLOWS: THE SOURIS RIVER AND

(undated).
22. INT't. JOINT COMM'N, supra note 15, at 11-13. A more specific explanation of how GDU
waters would enter Canada is:
CANADA

Waters used by Garrison would flow into three rivers in the Hudson Bay drainage
basin. Waters from the Middle Souris area would flow into the Souris River; those
front the New Rockford and Warwick-McVille areas into the Sheyenne River; and
those from the East Oakes area into the Wild Rice River. Both the Wild Rice and the
Shevenne empty into the Red River, which flows north into Manitoba. The Souris
enters Canada north ofWesthope, N.D., and flows into the Assiniboine River, which
also enpties into the Red at Winnipeg. Red and Assiniboine waters are connected to
bot h Lake Manitoba and Lake Winnipeg.
Nossal. supra note 3, at 2-3.
23. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 5.
24. INT'L.JOINT COMM'N, supra note 15, at 131.
25. Id. at 134-36.
26. INT'I JOINT COMM'N, supra note 18. This Report was supplemented with five lengthy
wchnical appendices: App. A, "Water Quality Report"; App. B, "Water Quantity Report"; App.
C. "Biology Report"; App. D, "Uses Report"; and App. E, "Engineering Report."Seeid.
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issued a report in 197727 which substantiated many of the Canadian
complaints. The IJC concluded that "the construction and
operation of the Garrison Diversion Unit as envisaged would cause
significant injury to health and property in Canada as a result of
adverse impacts on the water quality and on some of the more
important biological resources in Manitoba. "128
Some of the findings upon which this conclusion was based
include:
1. Water quality: The return flows would degrade municipal
water supplies of six Canadian communities and require an annual
expenditure of $59,000 (Can.) to $2,000,000 (Can.) for water
treatment. 29 Furthermore, the return flows "would have adverse
impacts on rural domestic, industrial, and agricultural water use in
Manitoba. "30
2. Biota transfer: The GdDU presents the possibility of
transferring to the Hudson Bay Drainage Basin fish species,
diseases and parasites indigenous to the Missouri River Drainage
Basin, but foreign to the Hudson Bay Drainage Basin. 3 1 The
' 32
impact of this biota on Canadian waters is "potentially severe
and "would be irreversible." 33 The foreign biota could cause major
reductions of highly valuable fish species, which would "threaten
the existence of the commercial fishery of Lakes Manitoba and
Winnipeg. ' 3 The IJC recommended that biota transfer "be
prevented at all costs. "35
3. Waterfowl: "It is estimated that GDU as envisaged would
result in an average annual loss of 177,500 ducks in North Dakota
due to changes in wetland habitat ....
[Tjhis loss... would mean
an average annual loss of approximately 35,000 ducks to
Manitoba. "36
4. Water quality: "Souris River flows would be increased by
the addition of return flows ....
,,17 This increase would cause
38
flooding in Canada of about 200 acres annually.
27. INT'l JOINT COMM'N, supra note 15.

28. Id. at 105.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 59.
31. Id. at 54.
32. Id. at 103.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 56. The IJC estimated that Manitoba's commercial freshwater fishing industry would
lose $6 million a year, and that the loss to recreational fishing would be $130,000 annually. Nossal.
supra nte 3, at 24.
35. INTt.JOINT COMM'N, supra note 15, at 102.

36. Id. at 57.
37. Id. at 45.
38. Id. at 46.
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THE INTERNATIONAL

JOINT COMMISSION REPORT AND CANADIAN CONCERNS

The conclusions of the IJC were a blow to GDU advocates.
Construction of the project was brought to a halt in 1977 because of
the IJC Report, domestic legal actions, 39 and questions about the
40
project within the federal government.
A number of alternatives to the 1965 authorized version were
proposed 4' before an agreement was made to proceed with
construction in two phases. 42 Phase I will reduce the number of
irrigated acres from 250,000 to about 85,000 and contains
safeguards ensuring that transboundary water pollution does not
occur. 4 3 The safeguards implement what is known as the closed

system concept: "closed" because protective measures are to
prevent any diverted water from entering the Hudson Bay
Drainage Basin. Phase II would, along with Phase I, complete the
GDU as envisaged by its 1965 authorization. Phase II, however,
will be developed only if it can be done without environmentally
44
harmful interbasin water transfer.
Congress accepted the idea of phased development, and after
it appropriated money for the project, construction recommenced
in 1983. 4s Congressional funding was, however, conditioned upon
the requirement that Phase I not affect Canadian waters. 4 6 In
addition, the United States Government has repeatedly assured
Canada that no part of Garrison Diversion with the potential of
47
damaging Canadian waters will be built.
Despite these assurances and the fact that the 1975 authorized
project has been diluted to phased development with a closed
system concept, Canadian concerns persist. In a 1982 Diplomatic
Note to the United States, Canada stated:
[F]eatures of Phase One could pose a significant threat of
damage to Manitoba waters and resources through the
7

39. H. HUGHES, supra note 1 , at 2.
40. See Nossal, supra note 3, at 12-26. Nossal makes references to criticisms of Garrison
Diversion by the President's Council on Environmental Quality, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Carter Administration. Id.
41. DFP'T OF INTERIOR, supra note 16, at 11-1-65 (details the various proposals).
42. Murry, supra note 7, at 4.
43. WATER AND POWER RESOURCES SERVICE UPPER Mo. REGION, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR,
SPECIAI

REPORT ON NORTH DAKOTA'S PLAN FOR PHASE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GARRISON DIVERSION

UNIT 12 (1981). Besides irrigation, Phase One includes construction of project supply works, lake
rcsloration, augmentation of certain municipal and industrial water supplies as well as fish, wildlife,
and recreation development. Id.
44. Murry, supra note 7, at 1.
45. Minneapolis TribuneJuly 17, 1983, at 5A, col. 1.
46. Id. at 5A, col. 2.
47. See id; H. HUGHES, supra note 17, at 2, 5; Murry, supra note 7, at 2-3.
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inter-basin transfers envisaged in this phase....
Furthermore, Canadian authorities are concerned
that Phase One does not appear to constitute a viable
project. If such is the case, and the first phase of Garrison
were to be built without appropriate authorization of
adjoining sections elsewhere in the Missouri Drainage
Basin which together added up to viable acreage, there
would be great pressure to complete the second phase of
the project in North Dakota despite the apparent impact
on Manitoba waters from the effects of consequent,
48
substantial inter-basin transfers.
A 1983 Canadian Diplomatic Note states that "continued
construction of the Garrison project as currently authorized is a
matter of considerable public and governmental concern in Canada
and particularly in Manitoba. '49
Canadian
fears have support.
The United States
Environmental Protection Agency has stated that it is "skeptical
that a closed system can be successfully designed and operated in
areas which do not drain naturally to the James/Missouri River
Basins." ' 50 Significantly, "[m]ore than 61 percent of the irrigation
acreage of the Phase I development is located within the Hudson
Bay Basin. ' 5 1 Were a smaller percentage of acres in this basin,
fears of an ineffective closed system would be less pronounced.
The latest development in the GDU chronicle was the United
States Senate's formation, in the summer of 1984, of the Garrison
Diversion Unit Commission (GDUC) to review the Garrison
Diversion project and propose modifications to it.52 The GDUC
represented a compromise between the project's proponents and
opponents, without which the project would likely have received no
further funds from Congress. Composed of twelve United States
citizens, the GDUC submitted a report that proposed significant
48. Canada Diplomatic Note No. 641 (Nov. 24, 1982) (a copy of this note is on file with the
author). See also Minneapolis Tribune, Oct. 29, 1983, at 4A, col. 1.
49. Canada Diplomatic Note No. 79 (Feb. 10, 1983) (a copy of this note is on file with the
author). According to one commentator, "Little faith is put [by Canadians] in the assurances by the
United States Senators that the money [appropriated for the GDU] will not be spent on construction

that would damage Manitoba." See Goldberg, The Garrison Diversion Project: New Solutions for
7ransboundary Pollution Disputes, 11 MAN. L.J. 177. 181 (1981).
50. Letter from S. Durham, United States Environmental Protection Agency, reprinted in FtNAL
SUPPILEMENTAl. ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ON FEATURES OF THE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT FOR

INItAt. DEVE.OPMENT OF 85,000 ACRES V-1 14, V-1 14 (Bureau of Reclamation 1983). The North
Dakota Chapter of the Wildlife Society has also expressed doubts about the ability of Phase One to
eliminate inter-basin transfer. Wildlife Soc'y Letter, supra note 20, at V-169, V-178, V-190.
51. Wildlife Soc'y Letter, supra note 20, at V-169.

52. See Act ofJuly 16, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-360, S207, 98 Stat. 403, 411-13.
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changes in the 1965 authorized version. 53
The GDUC recommended a dramatic reduction in the
number of acres to be irrigated and much greater emphasis on
municipal, rural, and industrial water development. Important
proposals concerning international environmental law were that
irrigation be restricted to land that drains naturally into the
Missouri River basin; that all municipal, rural, and industrial
water delivery into the Hudson Bay Drainage Basin be treated to
avoid biota transfer; and that Lonetree Reservior not be built
because its location at the headwaters of rivers in the Hudson Bay
area might result in the transfer of biota to Canadian waters. The
GDUC recommended that Lonetree Reservoir be replaced by a
canal to link the western and eastern sections of the venture.
Importantly, however, the reservoir and irrigation in the Hudson
Bay region have not been precluded by the GDUC report; 54 these
are only deferred pending a determination of need for the reservoir
by the federal government and satisfactory conclusion of
consultations with Canada regarding the irrigation issue.
Consequently, return flows of GDU waters from municipal, rural,
and industrial uses will take place and those from irrigation may
occur. 55

Therefore, notwithstanding revision to the GDU in response
to the IJC report and likely changes by Congress in conformance
with the GDUC report, 56 there persists the possibility of harm to
Canadian interests if the United States does not take
environmentally protective measures in its continuing development
of Garrison Diversion.
III.

THE
SOURCES
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

INTERNATIONAL

A foremost difficulty in international law is determining the
rights and duties created by it on a particular issue at a particular
time. One has neither the luxury of turning to a set of international
53. GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 20, 1984).

Pages i - iii and 1 - 3 of the Report are the source of the information in the following
paragraph.
54. Regarding the future of Lonetree Reservoir, North Dakota Senator Mark Andrews has said
that he intends to request the Senate to reinstate this feature. Whalen, Odds Tough for Lonetree Revival,
Bismarck Tribune, Dec. 17, 1984, at IB, col. 1. North Dakota's other senator. Quentin Burdick,
appears prepared to support such an attempt by his colleague. Id. at 5B, col. 1.
55. In addition, Dr. Gary Pearson contends that the Robinson Coulee area, a project leature
retained by the GDUC, still poses a risk of biota transfer into Canadian waters. Bradbury, Garrison
Opponents Happy, but Proposal Isn't Victory, Fargo Forum, Nov. 30, 1984, at 1B, col. 2.
56. The law establishing the GDUC directs the Secretary of Interior to implement the
Commission's recommendations. Act ofJuly 16, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-360, § 207(d), 98 Stat. 403,
413.
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statutes to answer legal problems nor volumino us case law offering
sophisticated analysis. The problem of defining the scope of
international law is exacerbated in those fields in which states have
not been concerned until recently, such as the environment. Just as
the development of most national environmental law has been
recent, so has been the formation of the international law of the
environment.

57

Despite the relative novelty of environmental concerns within
the international community, international environmental law has
gained a foothold and "it would be naive to suggest that there is a
complete juridical vacuum. "58 It is also true that environmental
rules have not developed at a similar pace in all areas. Whereas
international law is primitive in matters of air pollution, pesticide
use, and the export of hazardous substances, the international law
of water resources contains a number of reasonably well established
principles governing state conduct.
The guide to determining international environmental law,
and all international law, is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court ofJustice. Article 38(1) states that the court, in
deciding cases before it, is to apply: "(a) international conventions... ; (b) international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law; (c) general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations; (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law."

59

Therefore, international conventions, the practice of states,
general principles of law, judicial decisions, and authoritative
writings are the sources one must look to in studying the law of
international drainage basins. 60 Furthermore, a new source of
international law, particularly relevant for the environment and
not fully foreseen when Article 38(1) was drafted, 61 has developed
with the rapid growth of intergovernmental organizations and the
widespread use of international conferences. From these sources
emanate declarations, final acts, resolutions, and statements of
57. SeeJohnston, InternationalEnvironmental Law: Recent Developments and Canadian Contributions, in
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANISATION 555, 560 (R. MacDonald,

G.

Morris & D. Johnston eds. 1974). The author states, "lI]twas only after World War II that there
was a beginning of organized concern for the 'human environment' as a whole and of global effects to
treat specific aspects of it.'" Id.
58. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 69 (1974).
59. BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 397 (1. Brownlie 3d ed. 1983).
60. The subject of the sources of international law has received abundant analysis and all

gencral textbooks on international law include a chapter or two on the topic. Seegenerally Virally, The
&urcesof International Law, in MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 116-74 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968); C.
PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EV'DENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965).
61. D. CAPONERA, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES 4 (1980).
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principles that have become known as quasi-legislative or "soft"
(hortatory) law. Whether such pronouncements reach a quasilegislative status depends upon many factors, such as the wording
used and the number of states voting for the formulation or
otherwise expressing willingness to accept it. There is a keen debate
about the legal effect of these actions, but it is probably true that
they "play an important role in international environmental
law.' 6 2 Of this role it has been stated:
Above all, it seems necessary to dispel the old idea that
international law is created only through solemn, formal
acts of consent couched in the form of hard promises of
dispositive clarity, in the manner of a commercial
contract. More normally, the principles of international
not least in areas of wide-ranging environmental significance - will be developed in the tradition of constitutional, rather than contractual drafting....

63

It is to all of the above-mentioned sources that one must turn
to determine the substantive and procedural international legal
duties that the United States is bound to respect in the development
and eventual operation of North Dakota's Garrison Diversion
project.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. A

STATE'S GENERAL OBLIGATION

NOT TO CAUSE ANOTHER

STATE HARM

General principles of international law have an environmental
significance. Every state is bound by a general rule not to allow its
territory to be used for acts that are detrimental to the rights of
other states. 64 If this obligation is breached the rule supports the
idea that the offending state may be required to compensate the
62. A.

Kiss, SURVEY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 25

(1976). See alsoJ. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra Note 58, at 74; J. SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
OF THE ENVIRONMENT:

TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL

ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 83-84

(1979). Caponera states that the resolutions of organizations "have had a notable influence in the
processes of the formation of the general rules of international law.., and they have had the function
( fcrystallizing opinion and state practice whence international customary rules take their origin and
dtvclop." D. CAPONERA, supra note 61, at 17.
63. Johnston, The Environmental Law of the Sea: Historical Development, in THE ENVIRONMENTAl
L,W OF- tI S.A 17, 48 (D.Johnston ed. 1981).
64. Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental Protection, 13 NAT
REsoI'RCES.J. 179, 180 (1973).
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innocent state for the injury done. 6 5 "When a State causes,
maintains, or fails to control a source of harm to other States, or to
the nationals of other States, then existing principles of State
responsibility provide bases of liability no less sophisticated than
those of systems of municipal law. "66 Although this rule of state
responsibility developed before a general concern for the
environment was born and has been invoked with regard to issues
other than pollution, 67 it has obvious ramifications for
transboundary environmental damage.
The International Court ofJustice (ICJ) issued an authoritive
formulation of the rule that-a state is responsible for extraterritorial
harm in the 1949 Corfu Channel case. 68 The case concerned the
question of Albania's liability for failure to notify British ships of
the presence of mines in the straits of Corfu, a passageway within
the territorial waters of Albania. British ships struck the mines and
were damaged and British lives were lost. The ICJ reached "the
conclusion that Albania is responsible under international law for
the explosions which occurred.

. .

and for the damage and loss of

human life which resulted from them, and that there is a duty upon
Albania to pay compensation to the United Kingdom." 6 9
Significantly, the ICJ based this conclusion on "certain general
and well-recognized principles" 7 0 including "every State's
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of other States."' I
Had the ICJ not announced a general rule prohibiting harm,
there would still be international legal concepts to apply to
circumstances where harm in one state is the consequence of acts in
another. These concepts are "good
neighborliness,"
the
prohibition against "abuse of rights" and the old maxim sic utere tu
out alienum non laedas, which means "one must use his own so as not
to injure others." '7 2 "Good neighborliness" means that a state
65. Id.
66. /d. See also J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 58, at 69.
67. The rule has often been applied as the obligation a state has to prevent its territory from
Icing used to foment civil strife in another state. See 5 M. WHITEMAN, Dic.EsT OF IN'rERNA'l ONAL LAW
249-321 (1965); Brownlie, InternationalLaw and the Activities ofArmed Bands, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 712
(1958): L.,sterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States. 22 Ass. J. IN!'r. L.
105 (1928). Neutrality is another area in which the rule of state responsibility has traditionally been
applied. Ando, The Law of Pollution Prevention in InternationalRivers and Lakes, in THE LIGAI REc;Ists. OF
INTE NATrIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES 331, 333 (R. Zacklin & L. Caflisch eds. 1981).
68. U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
69. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
7(1. Id. at 22.
71. Id.
72. Blackstone illustrated the sic utere tuo concept with an example of river pollution bv stating
Ilat o ,: cannot "corrupt or poison a water course, by erecting a dyehouse or a lime-pit fior tie use of
ItF([a. isoIh1 upper part of the stream." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THlE I.AWS OF ENG;I.AXNo
218 (Chity ed. 1827).
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cannot do an act, such as develop a water diversion project, without
considering how the interests of its neighbor might be affected;
rather, it must consider such opposing interests and seek to
reconcile them with the proposed action.7 3 The "abuse of rights"
theory basically requires that good faith govern international
relations. 7 4 This theory is much like "good neighborliness" in that
it recognizes the interdependence of rights and obligations of states
and limits every right as necessary to render it compatible with
obligations arising from general international law and treaties. 75 As
each of these three concepts require a state to respect the rights and
interests of other states, they are obviously related. It has been
observed that "abuse of rights" is based on sic utere tuo and that
"good neighborliness" is but another name for the "abuse of
76
rights" doctrine.
It is doubtful, however, that the concepts make a great
contribution to international environmental law. Each suffers from
vagueness. The maxims do little to clarify a state's responsibility,
and each lacks elucidating criteria upon which a precise solution to
a transfrontier pollution problem could be based. On the other
hand, the concepts are important in that each acknowledges limits
(although unclear) upon the sovereignty of a state to develop its
resources. "Abuse of rights," "good neighborliness," and sic utere
tuo, along with the Corfu Channel opinion, contribute to the
affirmation that "state responsibility can be regarded as 'a general
principle of international law.... , ' 77
An appropriate conclusion to this general review of a state's
duty not to cause another state harm is reference to the
International Law Commission's 78 study of state responsibility.
For a general discussion of the "good neighborliness," "abuse of rights." and sicutere tuo
concepts, see Lester, River Pollution in International Law, 57 Am. J. INT't. L. 828, 832-36 (1963):
Arbitblit, The Plight of American Citizens Injured by Transboundary River Pollution, 8 Ecoi.ouv L.Q. 339,
363-66 (1979).
73. Arbitblit, supra note 72, at 363.
74. See B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED 13Y INTERNATIONAL COURTS ANt)
TRIBUNAtLS 121 (1953). See also H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAl LAW BYT
TIE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 162-65 (1958); Schwarzenberger, Uses and Abuses of the 'Abuse of R i,hts' in
International Law, 42 GROTIUS Soc'Y TRANSACTIONS FOR THe YEAR 1956, at 147 (1957);
WHITEMAN, supra note 67, at 224-30; Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDcE L.J. 22 (1935).

5 M.

The "abuse of rights" doctrine is, however, uncertain and controversial. E. BROWN, IuH
LEGAl REGIME OF HYDROSPACE 128 (1971). Also, the doctrine arguably has not yet reached that stage
where it can be considered a principle of international law. I. BROWNIFR, PRINCIPtLES (iF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 432 (2d ed. 1973).

75. B. CHENC,supra note 74, at 130-31.
76. SeeJohnston, supra note 63, at 21.
77. J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 62, at 142.
78. The International Law Commission is a body of the United Nations composed of
international law authorities. Upon the request of the General Assembly the Commission will study
an aspect of international law with the goal of drafting a code on that topic. For the Commission's
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, see 11980] 2 Y.B. INT't. L. COMM'N 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN
.4/SER.A/1980/Add. I (Part 2).
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The Commission's proceedings on state responsibility reveal its
recognition that transfrontier environmental damage is a wrongful
act according to principles of international law.
B.

A

STATE'S

GENERAL

OBLIGATION

TO

PREVENT

TRANS-

BOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE

Beyond the broad duty upon a state not to allow its territory to
be used to harm another state, there is a specific obligation in
international law to avoid environmental damage. "[C]ustomary
international environmental law has evolved to the point of clearly
outlawing state conduct which results in transfrontier pollution that
entails extra-territorial damage. "9
A number of sources support this statement. One of the most
important is the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment issued in 1972 at the conclusion of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment. 80 The purpose of
the conference was to set forth the environmental obligations of the
state and to develop institutions to promote these obligations.
Although environmental duties were enunciated in the Preamble
and Principles of the Stockholm Declaration, they are not
technically binding as the Declaration is not a convention. Even so,
the Declaration is significant as the view of 113 governments on
environmental obligations and has been labeled "the world
community's most authoritative charter on environmental rights
8
and duties."
The Preamble sets forth the basic obligation that "protection
and improvement of the human environment is.. .the duty of all
governments." 8 2 The more specific Principles follow, and although
their legal status is controversial, 3 several seem to be founded on
accepted international law. 84 Principles 21 and 2285 have been
79. Handl, The Principle of 'Equitable Use' as Applied to Internationally Shared Natural Resources: Its
Role in Resolving Potential InternationalDisputes Over Transfrontier Pollution, 14 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT
40, 44 (1979). Caponera states "that there is a clear affirmation of the general rule whereby the
rights of . States are limited in relation to any shared resources." D. CAPONERA, supra note 61, at
12.
80. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.
I)o .A/CONF.48/14 Rev. 1(1973).
81..Johnston, supra note 57, at 574.
82. Report, supra note 80, at 3.
83. Reniond-Gouilland, Preventionand Control ofMarine Pollution, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF
It K:
SEA 193, 201 (D. Johnston ed. 1981).
84. See Baxter, InternationalLaw in 'Her Infinite Variety, '29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 549, 559 (1980).
85. Report, supra note 80, Principles 21, 22. Those principles state as follows:
Principle 21: States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
Ithe principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
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referred to as "[tlhe most significant consensus that has been
reached in the field of international co-operation among States
respecting environmental preservation....

",86

Principle 21 refers to the United Nations Charter and
principles of international law and affirms the state obligation to
prevent transboundary pollution. On the other hand, the Principle
gives a state the sovereign right to develop its resources. Despite
this fundamental tension in its formulation, the Principle is an
87
important element of international law.
Principle
22,
the compensatory
requirement
for
transboundary pollution, is weaker than Principle 21 as it merely
recognizes the duty of states "to co-operate to develop further the
international law regarding liability and compensation."
Nonetheless, the implication of the Principle is that liability and the
duty to compensate are already a part of international law,
although in rudimentary form.
The adoption of Principles 21 and 22 by the community of
states represents approval of aspects of the arbitration award in the
Trail Smelter case 8 between Canada and the United States. The
Trail Smelter case arose out of the operation of a smelting plant at
Trail, British Columbia. Fumes from the plant drifted across the
United States-Canadian border and damaged crops, trees, and
other property in the state of Washington. The United States and
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 22: States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas
beyond their jurisdiction.
Id.
86. Olmstead, Prospectsfor Regulation of Environmental Conservation under International Law, in THE
PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS 245, 252 (M. Bos ed. 1973).
87. See Dupuy & Smets, Compensationfor Damage Due to Transfrontier Pollution, in COMPENSATION

FOR POLLUTION DAMAGE 181, 182 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ed. 1981). The authors state:
[Principle 211 formulated a primary obligation in law, the violation of which would
amount to an unlawful act giving rise to liability on the part of the State.... As firthe
content of the obligation, it in effect embodies, adapting it to the new environmental
context, the principle today regarded as custom-based by virtually all legal writers,
namely that of the harmless use of territory....
/d.It has also been said of Principle 21 that it "isa crystallization of international practice.' Utton,
InternationalWater Quality Law, 13 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 282, 293 (1973).
88. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM. J.
INT'L L. 684 (1941). Though the case primarily concerned air polluiionthe United States claimed
that the smelter disposed of wastes into the Columbia River and thereby damaged parts of the river
hat flowed through the United States. Id.
For accounts ofthe dispute, see Hoffman, State Responsibility in InternationalLaw and Transboundary
Pollution Injuries, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 509, 513-20 (1976); Read, 7he Trail Smelter Dispute, I CAN.
Y.B. INT'L. L. 213 (1963); Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. REV.
259(1971).
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Canada signed a compromis in 1935 that submitted the matter to
arbitration.8 9 Under the compromis Canada assumed international
responsibility for the damage, but the arbitration tribunal had to
decide the extent of the damage, the proper compensation for this
damage, and what form the future operation of the smelter ought to
take.
In its decision the tribunal stated:
The Tribunal.

.

. finds that.

. .

under the principles

of international law, as well as the law of the United
States no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in
or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Considering the circumstances of the case,
Tribunal

holds

that.

.

.

Canada

is

responsible

the
in

international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter.
Apart from the undertaking in the [compromis] it is,
therefore, the duty of the Government of the Dominion of
Canada to see to it that this conduct should be in
conformity with the obligation of the Dominion under
international law as herein determined. 90
The Trail Smelter case is one of the most important
developments in international environmental law in that "it
establishes the principle of international liability for damages
caused to the environment of another State. As a consequence of
this principle compensation has to be paid for such damage. "91
Some scholars disagree with this assessment. For example, it has
been said that because the compromis required the tribunal to apply
both law of the United States and international law, it is unclear
upon which legal basis the case was decided. 92 The tribunal did not
89. Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C.,
Apr. 15. 1935, Canada-United States, T.S. No. 893, reprinted in 30AM.J. INT'L L. 163 (Supp. 1936);
3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1907 (1941). Prior to the compromis the United States and Canada, in 1927,
referred the problem to the International Joint Commission under Article IX of the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty. Read, supra note 88, at 213-14. After a three year study the Commission
rtucommended a solution that was unsatisfactory to the United States. Id. at 214. After more
negotiation the United States and Canada entered into the compromis in 1935. Id.
90. 3 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 1905, 1965-66 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM.J. INT'L L. 684, 716-17
(1941).
91. A. Kiss, supra note 62, at 46.
92. Handl, Balancing of Interests and InternationalLiabilityfor the Pollutionof InternationalWatercourses:
Customary PrinciplesofLaw Revisited, 13 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 156, 168 (1975).
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wholly rely on the compromis in declaring Canada's duty and
remarked, as quoted above, that this duty arose "under principles
of international law" and "[a]part from the undertaking in the
[compromis]." It is also claimed that the tribunal's conclusion is
weakened because it is an arbitral award and not a judicial
decision. 93 This criticism is somewhat superficial. Rather than find
fault with the nature of the tribunal, one should assess its decision
by considering the stature of its membership and the cogency of its
reasoning. Despite these arguments (and in recognition that the
language of the award quoted above is dicta) the Trail Smelter case is
the foremost precedent 94 on responsibility for transboundary
pollution and is some proof that this obligation is a part of
international law.
Another case involving an environmental dispute between
Canada and the United States was the Gut Dam arbitration. 9 5 This
case arose out of flooding and erosion damage done in 1952 to the
United States side of the St. Lawrence River. United States
property owners argued that the damage was due, at least in part,
to Canada's construction of Gut Dam in 1902. The dam extended
across the international boundary between Adams Island in
Canada and Los Galops Island in the United States. Canada
sought United States approval for construction of the dam and
received it upon condition that Canada pay compensation to
United States citizens should the dam cause them any damage.
After the failure of negotiations over liability and
compensation the issue was submitted, in 1966, to an arbitration
tribunal 9 6 to determine three issues: one, which United States
claimants were entitled to compensation under the indemnification
of the original agreement; two, whether a time limit existed on
Canada's obligation to compensate under this agreement; and
three, causation and the amount of damages. After the first two
issues were answered in favor of the United States the two countries
reached an accord in 1968 whereby Canada paid $350,000 in full
settlement. 9 7 This case, however, is of little value in assessing
93. See J. BARROS & D.JOHNSTON, supra note 58, at 75.

94. Kirgis, Technological Challenge to the Shared Environment: United States Practice, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
290,294(1972).
95. Report of the Agent of the United States Before the Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal, reprinted
in 8 INr' LEGAI MATERIALS 118 (1969).
For accounts of the Gut Dam dispute, see Lillich, The Gut Dam Claims Agreement with Canada, 59
AM..J. INT't. L. 892 (1965); 3 M.

WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 768-70 (1964).

96. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of (tanada Concerning the Establishment ofan International Arbitral Tribunal to Dispose of United
Slatws Claims relating to Gut Dam, March 25, 1965, Canada-United States, 52 Dep't of State Bull.
643 (Apr. 26, 1965), reprintedin 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 468 (1965).
97. Report, supra note 95, at 142. The report states, "The negotiated settlement has met with
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whether or not international law imposes a general obligation not to
pollute. Although Gut Dam caused environmental damage and
Canada paid for much of the property loss (which is itself
significant), it did so because of its promise under the 1902
agreement. Canada assumed no liability, nor did the arbitral
tribunal impose it, under a general principle of international
environmental law.
Besides the Trail Smelter case, national courts have invoked
international law in deciding disputes between federated states.
These decisions reinforce international law's proscription against
transboundary pollution. 98 As three of these cases specifically
concern rivers they will be discussed below in the section on a
state's duty not to pollute an international drainage basin. 99 One
other national case, Solothurn v. Aargau, 100 involved a dispute
between two Swiss cantons. The Swiss court, citing international
law, stated the following about the limits of state sovereignty:
[T]he Canton of Solothurn appears in fact to have
been injured in its territorial majesty and in its
sovereignty by the attitude of the Canton of Aargau. If
objection should be made thereto, to the effect that the
Canton of Aargau for its part may use its territory or
cause it to be used as it pleases, the reply must be that in
international law, especially in relations within federal
states, the principle of law of vicinage holds.

.

. that the

exercise of one's own rights should not prejudice the
rights of one's neighbors....

01

Pronouncements of the United Nations General Assembly, the
United Nations Environment Programme, and the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development are representative of
the recognition intergovernmental organizations have given the
proscription against transboundary environmental damage.
In its session following the Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted Resolution 2995, which reiterated the essence of
Stockholm Principle 21 and advocated implementation of it and
approval of both governments and has generally been greeted favorably by the individuals
damaged.- Id. at 143.
98. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
100.
- BG II - , - ATF II
-_ (1878). See Schindler, The Administration ofJustice in the
Swiss FederalCourt in IntercantonalDisputes, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 149, 172-74 (1921).
101. Solothurn v. Aargau, __
BG II -,
ATF II __
(1878).
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Principle 22.102 Resolution 2996 followed, and it reaffirmed those
same two principles. 10 3 A 1973 resolution also reaffirmed these
principles and the "duty of the international community to adopt
measures to protect and improve the environment....

",104

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was
adopted by the 1974 session of the General Assembly; 10 5 its Article
30 states:
The protection, preservation and enhancement of
the environment for the present and future generations is
the responsibility of all States. .

.

. All States have the

responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. All States should cooperate in
evolving international norms and regulations in the field
of the environment.

106

Although the formal legal status of General Assembly
resolutions (as well as resolutions of other intergovernmental
bodies) is questionable,1 0 7 they arguably evidence the attitudes and
practice of states and thus manifest customary international law. 1 08
Recent enunciations of the General Assembly on state
responsibility for transboundary pollution include its adoption of
the World Charter for Nature' 0 9 in 1982 and its 1980 resolution on
the Historical Responsibility of States for the Preservation of
Nature for Present and Future Generations."10
102. G.A. Res. 2995, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1973). This
ltxsol1tion is entitled Co-operation Between States in the Field of the Environment and was approved
hy,a vote of 115 in favor with ten abstentions. Johnston, supra note 57, at 578.
103. G.A. Res. 2996, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, U.N. )oc. A/8730 (1973). This
resolution is entitled International Responsibility of States in Regard to the Environment and was
hptetd with 112 votes in favor and ten abstentions. Johnston, supra note 57. at 578.
104. G.A. Res. 3129, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 48-49, U.N. D)o(. A/9030 (1974),
reprinted
in 13 INT'L LEGAL. MATERIAI.S 232 (1974). The resolution is entitled Co-operation in the Field
ofilhe Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States. Id. at 48.
105. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 50 (1975),
reprinted in 14 INT'i. LEGAl. MATERIALS 251 (1975). The restolution was adopted btya vote of 120 for,
six against, and ten abstentions. 14 INT't LEGAl. MATERIAi.S 251 (1975).
106. G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 105, at 55, reprintedin 14 INT't I,(;A, MAT'ERtALS 260-61 (1975).
Article 30 of the resolution was adopted with a vote of 126 in favor and three ablsetions. 14 INT).
LEG(;ALMA'TrRIAI.s 265 (1975).
107. For analyses ofthe legal effect of United Nations resolutions, sc.J. CASrANnA, Tt1.. L ;AL
E-FET' OF UNITED NATIONS RESOILUTION (1969); 0.
ASAMOAH, THE LFI;A. SIGNIFICANCE OF TIE
I)p(:t.ARArtON OF THE GENERAI. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNnTM) NATIONS (1966); Falk, On the QuasiLeIslative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT't. L. 782 (1966); Johnson, 7"heEffects of
Re lutions ofthe GeneralAssembly of the United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'U. L. 97 (1957).
108. Handl, supra note 79, at 59.
109. World Charter forNature, reprinted in 10 ENVTt.. PonY & .. 30 (1983).
110. G.A. Res. 35/8, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/35/48/Add. 1 (1981).
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The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has
studied the measures being adopted by states to promote cooperation in the development of natural resources shared by states.
The resulting report 1 1 ' was followed by UNEP's formation of a
working group, which drafted a comprehensive code concerning
shared natural resources." 2 The code advocates the elimination of
adverse transboundary environmental effects and international
cooperation in the management and use of shared natural
3
resources. 1
The
Organisation
for
Economic
Co-operation
and
Development (OECD), of which the United States and Canada are
members, has also been involved in developing state responsibility
for transfrontier environmental damage. Examples of the
Organisation's work include its Council Recommendation For the
Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and NonDiscrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution" 14 and On
Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution. 1 5 The latter
recommendation reaffirms Stockholm Principle 21 and advocates
that states cooperate in developing environmental policies and in
settling transfrontier problems. It also advises OECD member
states to "take all appropriate measures to prevent and control
transfrontier pollution ' 1 6 and to "endeavour to prevent any
increase in transfrontier pollution, including that stemming from
new or additional substances and activities. . . .""I The GDU is a
new activity, and if Missouri River biota enter Canadian waters via
the project, they would constitute new substances.
As the Statute of the International Court of Justice makes the
teachings of publicists a means of ascertaining international law, it
is to this source one can look for further evidence substantiating the
Ill. Report of the Executive Director, Cooperation in the Field of the Enviroment Concerning
Nanolal Resources Shared by Two or More States, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/44/Corr. I and 2/Add. I
(1975).
1 12. The Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on Natural Resources Shared by Two
or Morc States met live times. See U.N. Docs. UNEP/GC/74 (1976), UNEP/IG.3/3 (1976),
UNEP/IG.7/3 (1977), UNEP/IG.10/2 (1977), UNEP/IG.12/2 (1978). This last report contains the
draft code which is entitled Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the
(uilance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by
Two or More States.'" See 17 INT't. LEGAL MATERIALS 1097 (1978),(text of the code)).
113. For a discussion of the historical development of the Draft Principles and a short
coiiicntary on each, see Adede, United Nations Efforts Toward the Development of an Environmental Code

of Conduct for States Concerning Harmonious Utilization of Shared Natural Resources, 43 AL B. L. REv. 488
(1979).
114. OECD Doc. C(74) 224 (Nov. 21, 1974), reprintedin 14 INT'L LEGAl.MATERIALs 242 (1975).
115. OECD Doc. C(77) 28 (FINAL) (May 23, 1977), reprintedin 16 INir'L
LEGAL MAt ERIALS 977
(1977).
116. Ret'ommendation fr the Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and NonI)isrin iniatiion in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, reprinted in 14 INT't. LEGAL MAT'ERIAL S 244
(1975).

117. Id.
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legal obligation to prevent transboundary pollution. Rather than
discuss the views of individual authorities," 8 two groups of experts
may be referred to, the International Law Commission (ILC) and
the International Law Association (ILA).
The ILC has been studying the law of state responsibility and
believes that such responsibility may arise when transboundary
environmental harm occurs. In addition, the ILC recently began
inspecting international liability for injurious consequences arising
out of acts not prohibited by international law. The initial report by
the subject's Special Rapporteur affirmed the "principle that
States, even when undertaking acts that international law [does]
not prohibit [have] a duty to consider the interests of other States
that might be affected." 1 19 Issues of transfrontier environmental
damage will apparently receive the bulk of the ILC attention in its
120
study of the topic.
The ILA, a widely respected private organization founded in
1873 and composed largely of international law experts, adopted
Rules of International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution
(Rules) in 1982. Article 3(1) of the Rules declares: "States are in
their legitimate activities under an obligation to prevent, abate and
control transfrontier pollution to such an extent that no substantial
injury is caused in the territory of another State." 121 Significantly,
comment one to the Rule's first article states that the "rules restate
general international law as actually existing in the field of
transfrontier pollution and should therefore be applied in the
relations between States ....",122 Thus, the ILA does not attempt
to develop international law; rather it merely states what the law is.
Although there is no convention containing provisions
protecting the environment as a whole, there are hundreds of
bilateral and multilateral agreements that seek to protect elements
of the environment. Most of these agreements are regional, but a
few have global aspects. Environmentally protective components
118. Examples of such views include: "[E]merging principles of international environmental
law suggest some international constraints on a nation's freedom to pursue any resource policy it
chooses, at least if those policies disregard the environment of other nations." Bilder, International
Law and Natural Resources Policies, 20 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 451, 460 (1980). International common law
prescribes "international liability for injury caused to a foreign country in case the environment of
the later has suffered damage" and this is "one of the main principles of international
environmental law .. " A. Kiss, supra note 62, at 18. Underlying the various formulae for a general
rule prohibiting transfrontier pollution "there is certainly a principle which definitely reflects
ctustonary law, namely the principle whereby every State is forbidden to allow its territory to be used
in a way prejudicial to the rights of other States." Dupuy, International Liability .or Tranofrontier
Pollution, in TRENDS IN ENVtRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 366 (M. Bothe ed. 1980).
119. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 119801 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 159, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER. A/1930/Add. 1 (Part 2).
120. See2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 160-61.
121. INT'L LAW Ass'N., REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CONFIRENCE HEtID AT MONTREAt 160 (1983).
122. Id. at 158.
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can be found in conventions concerning numerous subjects, for
example, the Antarctic, 123 outer space, 124 nuclear weapons
26
testing, 21 5 and the marine environment. 1

All of the above sources lend credence to the general
conclusion that extraterritorial pollution is illegal under
international law. Two qualifications, however, must be made.
First, it is not a breach of international law if just minor
environmental damage results. Second, international liability for
transfrontier pollution is not strict, but arises only upon fault.
Transfrontier pollution must reach a certain level of severity
before international legal responsibility attaches; that is, merely
polluting the environment of another state is not in itself a
violation. The level of severity that must be reached is often
referred to as "material." The Trail Smelter judgment ruled that a
state is only responsible for environmental damage "when the case
is of serious consequence," 1 27 thus rejecting an absolute prohibition
against transboundary pollution. Furthermore, the ILA has stated
that "the majority of the international scholars agree that
interferences on the territory of other States constitute an
internationally wrongful act only when they produce substantial
injury.' ' 2M Gunter Handl, a professor at Wayne State law school,
has examined case law and the practice of states and concluded:
[I]njury in the sense of material damage is the foundation
of state responsibility in cases where a state activity lawful
per se entails extraterritorial environmental effects. The
mere fact of the "violation of sovereignty" implicit in the
transfrontier crossing of pollutants is thus insufficient to
render a state liable for the activity generating the
pollutant. 129
123. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 12, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780.
124. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Spa'c, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S.
No. 6347.
125. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 reprinted in 57 AM. J.
INT'L. I. 1026(1963).
126. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter,
l)c. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165.
127. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM.
J. INT' L. 684, 716(1941).
128. INT'i. LAW Ass'N, supra note 121, at 161. In addition, Article 3(1) of the ILA's Rules on
Transfrontier Pollution also sets the threshold for international responsibility at the occurrence of
"substantial injury." Id. at 160. Article 3(2) of the rules, however, abandons the "substantial
injury- requirement where "new and increased transfrontier pollution" is concerned. In such a case
'States shall limit [the pollution] . . . to the lowest level that may be reached by measures practicable
and reasonable under the circumstances." Id.
129. Handl, TerritorialSoveretinty and the Problem of TransnationalPollution, 69 AM. J. INT'i, L. 50,
72 (1973). Professor Brownlie seems to agree, stating as follows: "Existing customary law is tolerant
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Scholars are debating whether there is strict liability for
extraterritorial environmental injury. Strict liability is defined as
"liability without fault, and it may be said to exist when
compensation is due from one actor to another for injuries caused
' 30
despite compliance with any particular standards of care.'
Under this concept, no international liability will attach to a state
where the harm originates only when damage is caused by a force
majeure, act of God, or by intervention of third parties. 131 A
number of publicists contend that international decisions,
conventions, and state practice indicate that strict liability is a rule
of international law applicable to incidents of environmental
harm. 3 2 Closer analysis of the sources relied upon by these
scholars, however, proves the nonexistence of strict liability in
international law.1 33 On the contrary, the general standard for
liability in cases of transfrontier pollution is fault.134 This standard
imposes liability not strictly, but only when harm is caused
intentionally or negligently. Fault liability for negligence occurs
when a state fails to take reasonable care to avoid environmental
damage that it can reasonably foresee. 135
C.

A

STATE'S

ENVIRONMENTAL

GENERAL
DAMAGE

OBLIGATION
TO

TO

INTERNATIONAL

PREVENT
WATER

RESOURCES

Three basic theories regarding the use of international
watercourses have existed throughout the history of international
water law. The three concepts are absolute territorial sovereignty,
36
absolute territorial integrity, and limited territorial sovereignty.
o a degrce of 'ordinary-user' including certain, at present tolerated, levels of contamination and
pollution.'' Brownlie, supra note 64, at 180. Likewise, "industrial societies have necessarily
developed a tolerance to some degree of [transboundary] pollution." lanni, Internationaland Private
Actionsin TransboundaryPollution, 11 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 258, 262 (1973).
For international water resources the rule is the same, for only in the case of "substantial
damage to other States . . . is there a violation ofa rule of international law." D. CAPONERA, supra
note 61, at 8.

130..J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 62, at 163-64.
131. Id.at 164.
132. Id. at 163-67; Note, New Perspectives on International Environmental Law, 82 YALE L.J. 1659,
1665 (1973). Another authority states, "A number of writers consider that a State must ensure that
no environmental damage emanating from areas under its
jurisdiction iscaused to other countries.
This view results in postulating a system of absolute liability in respect of the environment .... "
Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, in 159 RECUEtt. DES COuRS 1978-1 1, 272
(Academie De Droit International 1979).
133. See Handl, supra note 92; Hand, State Liability for Accidental Transnational.Environmental
I)atmag'e by Private Person, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1980). Professor Handl concedes, however, that a
start, may incur strict liability for transnational damage due to an accident involving an abnormally
dangerous activity. Id. at 564.
134. Handl, state liability, supra note 133, at536 n.50.
135. Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of International Law, 14 INT'L &
(oP . Q. 1189, 1196 (1965).
136. See F. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-39 (R. Batstone trans. 1959); Caponera &
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Absolute territorial sovereignty is also known as the Harmon
Doctrine, having been enunciated by United States Attorney
General Harmon in 1895 in response to Mexico's protest against
diversion of the Rio Grande River. 137 Attorney General Harmon
asserted that "[t]he fundamental principle of international law is
the absolute sovereignty of every nation, as against all others,
within its own territory." 3 8 Based on this, Harmon concluded that
"the rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose
39
no liability or obligation upon the United States.'
Under the absolute territorial sovereignty theory, or Harmon
Doctrine, a state has the unfettered right to do what it wishes with
its natural resources, even though it causes damage to another
state. The Harmon Doctrine, however, has been rejected by the
international community. 40 " [I]n the present state of international
law, the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty has become
14
untenable and. . . the Harmon Doctrine is a thing of the past. ", 1
On the other hand, the antithesis of the Harmon Doctrine,
absolute territorial integrity, has also been denied by international
law.' 42 This theory (also known as the natural flow theory)
demands that a lower riparian receive water in an unaltered state,
otherwise a violation of its territorial integrity results. Were this
principle a part of international law, an unacceptable situation
would result: a downstream state could halt any water project of its
co-basin state, even if the project would cause little or no harm.
The third concept in international water law, limited
territorial sovereignty, seeks to reconcile the first two theories.
There seems to be two versions of this concept. One version is
referred to as the equitable utilization theory and the other as the
community theory. 143 Under the equitable utilization theory, states
have the obligation "to attempt to reconcile their interests with
those of other potentially affected states; and .. .any claim to the
rightful use of a shared natural resource has, therefore, to be judged
in . . .the overall social, environmental and economic context in
Allieritiere, Principlesfor International Groundwater Law, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. '589, 614-16 (1978):
Utlon,t iupra note 87, at 282-83.
137. McCaffrey, Trans-Boundary Pollution Injuries: JurisdictionalConsiderations in Private Litlqation
I&'tween Canadaand theUnited States, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 191, 206 (1973).
'138. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 283 (1895). For a discussion of'the Harmon Doctrine, see Utton.
International Environmental Law and Consultation Mechanisms, 12 CoiOm. J. TRANSNAIt'. L. 56, 57-59
(1973): Lester, supra note 72, at 831-32.
139. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 283 (1895).
140. See Lester, supra note 72, at 847.
141. Statement by M. Williams, INT'L LAW Ass'N, supra note 121, at 180.
142. See Utton, supra note 87, at 285; LeMarquand, Politics qfInternationalRiver Basin Cooperation
andAlanat,'ement, 16 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 883, 890 (1976).
143. See Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 136, at 615-16; Utton, supra note 87, at 283:
1AMarrqoand, supra note 142, at 890.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

which the right is being asserted."

14 4

[VOL. 60:603

The community theory

recognizes the physical and biological unity of the waters of a
drainage basin. Despite the fact such waters might cross one or
nimore international boundaries, the concept demands that the coriparians manage and develop them cooperatively and that their
benefits be shared equitably.14 5 Clearly, each version of the limited
territorial sovereignty concept limits absolute territorial sovereignty
as well as absolute territorial integrity.
Of all these theories, the principle of equitable utilization "has
become the most widely advocated by the international
community, as evidenced by treaties, judicial decisions, academics,
and

international

'4 6

bodies.'

With

the

rejection

of absolute

territorial sovereignty and integrity, it is appropriate to cite some
sources that have led to the acceptance of limited territorial
sovereignty (equitable utilization), the concept that now governs
the uses of international drainage basins.
1. JudicialDecisions
The only international case addressing the issue of pollution of
an international river is the Lake Lanoux arbitration' 47 between
France and Spain. The dispute arose out of France's intention to
divert

water from

Lake

Lanoux for a hydroelectric

project.

Although Lake Lanoux is in French territory, the Carol River
originates in the lake and flows into Spain. Spain contended that
the proposed French diversion would alter the Carol and injure
Spanish interests, thus violating a convention it had with France,
the 1866 Treaty of Bayonne, and its Additional Act of the same
date. Although the arbitral tribunal concluded that France had not
breached these agreements, it commented on water pollution. The
tribunal, after concluding that none of the Spanish "users will
suffer in his enjoyment of the waters," t' 4

8

stated:

144. Handl, The Principleof 'Equitable Use' as Applied to Internationally Shared Natural Resources: Its
Role in Resolving PotentialInternationalDisputes Over Transfrontier Pollution, in TRANSFRONFIER PoLtLU
OTON
AND -I-orE ROL+E OF STATES 98, at 103 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ed. 1981). Further

elucidation of the equitable utilization principle can be ibund in the comments to Articles IV-XI of
the Helsinki Rules. See INT'L LAW Ass'N, supra note 6, at 486-505.
145. See Utton, supra note 87, at 283.
146. LeMarquand, supra Note 142, at 890. See also Johnston, supra note 63, at 22; Caponera &
Alheritiere. supra note 136, at 615; Nanda, Emerging Trends in the Use of InternationalLaw and Institutions
for the Management of International Water Resources, 6J. INT'il L. & Po'v 239, 258 (1976). "The idea ol
equitable utilization now is embodied in some 300 international agreements dealing with rivers.
lakes, and drainage basins throughout the world." Bilder, supra note 118, at 459.
147. 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281, 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957)(Lake Lanoux ArbitralTribunal).
For an analysis of the case, see Laylin & Bianchi, The Role qfAdjudication in International River
Disputes: The Lake Lanoux Case, 53 AM. J. INT'l. L. 30 (1959).
148. Lake Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 281, 303, 24 1.I,. R.101,123 (1957)
(Lake Lanoux Arbitral Tribunal).
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One might have attacked this conclusion in several
different ways.
It could have been argued that the works would
bring about an ultimate pollution of the... Carol or that

the returned waters would have a chemical composition
or a temperature or some other characteristic which could
injure Spanish interests. Spain could then have claimed
that her rights have been impaired in violation of the
Additional Act. Neither the "dossier" nor the debates of
4 9
this case carry any trace of such an allegation. 1
Scholars of international law have used this language to
support arguments for the existence of an international duty to
avoid water pollution. For example, one scholar has written that
"the tribunal's statement might well stand as an expression of a
principle of general international law on the responsibility of a
riparian State for the pollution of an international river or lake. "110
One other international decision has relevance to the issue of a
state's obligation to prevent pollution of an international river. The
River Oder case,151 decided by the Permanent Court of International
Justice, adopted a broad standard that requires a state in its use of a
river to recognize and respect the uses to which a co-riparian puts
the river. This conclusion is based on the following language of the
decision:
[A] community of interest of riparian States.

.

. becomes

the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of
which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the
use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of
any preferential privilege of any riparian State in relation
to the others.1

52

Although the River Older case was not concerned with the
environment, it supports the principle that a state is obligated to
prevent river pollution as its approach, founded on a "community
of interest of riparian States," and implicitly accepts the limited
149. Id. Spain did not, however, produce evidence of such an injury, a failure that barred the
( 'lai i

*

150. Ando, supra note 67, at 336. See alsoJ. SCHNEIDER, supra note 62, at 49-50; Lester, supra note
72, at 839. Other writers, however, disagree with Ando's conclusion. See A. Kiss, supra note 62, at
47.
151. Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River
(ler (U.K., Fr., Swed., Den., Ger. Reich, & Czech. v. Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23
(Judgment of Sept. 10).
152. Id. at 27.
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territorial sovereignty theory. 13
Besides international judicial decisions, national cases
involving river disputes between federated states support the claim
that international law places restraints upon a state's use of an
international drainage basin. National decisions are used to
determine the relevant international law for two reasons. First,
disputes between federated states have close analogies with those
between sovereign states. 154 Second, national tribunals have
referred to international law to solve their river disputes, and thus
their opinions aid in determining and elucidating international
law.' 50 A third reason for the use of national decisions is the
distressing lack of international decisions. Be this as it may,
national decisions comprise most of the judicial support for the
obligation under consideration, although it must be remembered
that these are but quasi-international decisions and must be used
cautiously.
Relying expressly on international law, the German Supreme
Court, in resolving a disagreement between Wurtemberg, Prussia
and Baden over the Danube, stated:
The exercise of sovereign rights by every State in regard
to international rivers traversing its territory is limited by
the duty not to injure the interests of other members of
the international community. Due consideration must be
given to one another by States through whose territories
there flows an international river. This principle has
gained increased recognition in international rela1
,,56
tions .
Similarly, the Italian Court of Cassation has ruled:
153. See Handl. supra note 79. at 42:,J. ScHNEIDER, supra note 62, at 43: D. CAPON RA.supra note
61. at 8: Goldie, Development of an InternationalEnvironmental Law. An Appraisal, in LAW, INSTtTUrIONS
AND1 I IF.GIOBAL ENVIRONMENT 104, 130 (J. Hargrove ed. 1972).
154. The policies, water economics, and the factual problems "are not essentially different in
interstate and international disputes." Laylin & Bianchi, supra note 147, at 41. Lester writes "that
Iterc ire sufficient similarities of principle in this area to Justify reference to Federal sources."
lxsttr. supra note 72, at 845. Professor Utton states that "[although national judicial decisions
rcsolving interstate disputes are not strictly international decisions, they do provide helpful guidance
it internatiinal courts," Utton, supra note 87, at 288. On the other hand, it has been stated that
"'*I II analigy between inter-state federal . . . law and international law is not so simple . . . as it is
ofilCil IirCated.i-

B. CHAUHAN, SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONALt

WATER Dtspttr s IN INTERNATIONAL

I )R \sNGi: BASINs 407 (1981).
155. With regard to the United States Supreme Court. it has been -suggested that although the
iourI applies a special 'federal common law' it leans heavily on intetrnational law sources flo its
inaterials of decision.'' Goldie. supra note 153, at 159 n. 115 The Court has itself stated: "Sitting, as
it were. is an international. as well as a dn cstic tribunal, we alllv Federal law, state law. anti
intiroatiioal la,,. as the exigencies of the particular case may denianit .
Kansas v. Ciilorado,
185 U.S. 125. 146-47(1902).
156. \7utietberg v. Baden, 4 Ann. Digest 128. 131 (Stiatsgerichtsho f1927).
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[A]lthough a State, in the exercise of its right of
sovereignty, may subject public rivers to whatever regime
it deems best, it cannot disregard the international
duty... not to impede or to destroy... the opportunity of
the other States to avail themselves of the flow of water for
57
their own national needs. 1
Thus, the Italian court rejected the absolute territorial
sovereignty concept as did the Swiss Federal Court (Bundesgericht)
in settling a river problem between the cantons of Zurich and
158
Aargau.
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with many
interstate river disputes. 1 59 Rather than examine these decisions
individually, it will suffice to note several conclusions that can be
drawn from these cases. In treating the litigants of these cases
largely as sovereign states the Court has never accepted the extreme
theories of absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial
integrity, but has resorted to equitable balancing tests to decide the
disputes.1 60 Furthermore, "in all decisions... concerning pollution
of inter-State rivers,.
the Court acted on the presumption that a
riparian State of the federation which shares a watercourse should
not pollute its waters so as to cause serious damage to the interests
of other riparians. ''161
Although only a small number of judicial decisions concerning
river pollution have been mentioned here, "in almost every system
of municipal water law will be found the principle that one State
using water must take into consideration the use of water by other
States. .
"162
This is an important finding, for although
157. Societe Energie Electrique du Littoral Mediterranean v. Compagnia Impresse Elettriche
,iguri._
Forte It. I __
, 9 Ann. Dig. 120, 121 (Corte Cass. 1939).
158. Solothurn v. Aargau, __
BGII __,
ATFII ___. See Schindler, supra note 100, at

169-72. The Swiss Court stated:
In the case of public waters which extend over several cantons and, therefore, belong
to several cantons, it follows from the equality ofthe cantons that none of them may, to
the prejudice of the others, take such measures upon its territory, as the diversion of a
river or brook, construction of dams, etc., as may make the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty over the water impossible for the.other cantons, or which exclude the joint
use thereof or amount to a violation of territory.
Id. at 170.

159. SeeNebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943);
Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); Wyoming
%. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494 (1932); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); NewJersey v. New
York. 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); North Dakota v.
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200
U.S. 496 (1906).
160. Lester, supra note 72, at 845-46.
161. Ando, supra note 67, at 337.
162. ). CAPONERA, supra note 61, at 19.
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municipal law in itself is not a source of international law, it can
assist the development and comprehension of international law.
Judge McNair, in his separate opinion in InternationalStatus of South

West Africa, stated:
To what extent is it useful or necessary to examine what
may at first sight appear to be relevant analogies in

private law systems and draw help and inspiration from
them? International law has recruited and continues to
recruit many of its rules and institutions from private

systems of law. Article 38(I) (c) of the Statute of the
[International] Court [of Justice] bears witness that this
process is still active, and it will be noted that this article
authorizes the Court to "apply . . . the general principles

of law recognized by civilized nations.

"163

Thus, if most nations restrict the use of rivers in their municipal
law, so too might international law.
2. Treaties

There is a large and expanding body of international
agreements concerning watercourses and drainage basins, and
many contain pollution related clauses. 164 Space limitations make it
impossible to study these treaties thoroughly. What is important to
note is that nearly all of these treaties adopt in some form the
principle of equitable utilization. 165 Although treaties only bind the

parties involved, a similar clause appearing in many agreements
can have legal significance beyond the signatories, for treaties
I1).

163. International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 148 (Advisory Opinion of July

164. In 1975 Professor Bilder stated that "[there are now some 300 international agreements
dealing with particular rivers, lakes or drainage basins, which together cover something less than
one-half of the world's international drainage basins." Bilder, The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of
the International Law of the Environment, in 144 RECUEIL DES COURS 1975-I, at 139, 168 (Academie De
Droit International 1976).
For surveys, of varying completeness, of agreements concerning international rivers, see United
Nations: Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization of Ifiternational Rivers
lbr Other Purposes than Navigation, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963); [1974] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N Part 2, at 33-56, U.N. Doc. 4/SER.A/1974/Add. 1. For a list of 133 treaties on international
rivers and lakes with provisions on pollution prevention, see Ando, supra note 67, at 358-70. For a less
complete list of such treaties, see A. kiss, supra note 62, at 73-76. For a list of International
Agreements Between Governments on Transfrontier Pollution and Land-Use Management, see
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN FRONTIER REGIONS 55-90 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ed.

1979). This book also contains detailed chapters on a number of agreements seeking to control
pollution in various rivers and lakes. Id. at 231-503. Lastly, Chauhan mentions throughout his book
many international agreements concerning water resources in general. See B. CI-AUHAN, supra note
154.
165. Bilder, supra note 164, at 168.
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generate international customary law. A number of "rules of
international customary law have their origin in standards of
conduct which were developed over centuries in a multitude of
treaties.'

' 66

Therefore,

as numerous states in a multitude of

bilateral and multilateral agreements have practiced the doctrine of
limited territorial sovereignty, the doctrine may now be an
38(1) (b) of the Statute
international customary law within Article
67
1
ofJustice.
Court
International
the
of
Canada and the United States have reached a number of
agreements with environmental significance. 16 Two significant
agreements are the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty 169 and the 1972
Lakes
(Great
Agreement
Quality
Water
Lakes
Great
70
Lakes
the
Great
pacts,
particularly
Agreement). 1 As each of these
Agreement, contain clauses illustrative of the body of agreements
concerning international watercourses, it will be helpful to mention
several of their provisions.
The Boundary Waters Treaty was not drafted with
environmental considerations directly in mind. Its primary
purpose, as mentioned in the Preamble, is to prevent disputes
along the common border and to settle those pending as well as any
that might arise in the future. The treaty focuses on disputes related
to navigation and the flow and level of transboundary waters.
Article IV contains the sole specific environmental provision, and
even it appears to have been added to the Article as an
afterthought. The clause states that "boundary waters and waters
166. G. SCHWARZENBHERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (6th ed. 1976).
On treaties as customary law, see D'Amato, Treaties as a Source of General Rules of InternationalLaw, 3
HARV. iNT'L L.J. 1(1962).
167. For the text of Article 38(i), see supra, text accompanying note 59. On treaties as authority
for the rule that limited territorial sovereignity is a part of international law, Ando states:
[Wjith respect to the great majority of international rivers and lakes, where the
pollution of their waters is causing problems among riparians, the riparian's concern
has almost always crystallized into a legal obligation formulated in various treaty
provisions. Even though some of these provisions refer only indirectly to pollution, a
consistent tendency is observable towards the formation of an opiniojuriswhich makes
the prevention of pollution in international rivers and lakes obligatory for riparians.
Ando, supra note 67, at 343.
168. On United States-Canadian boundary relations and problems in general, see Carroll &
Mack, On Living Together in North America: Canada, the United States and International Environmental
Relations, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 35 (1982); Cohen, The Regime of Boundary Waters - The
Canadian-UnitedStates Experience, in 146 RECUEIL DES COURS 1975-II, at 219 (Academie De Droit
International 1977); Jordan, The International Joint Commission and Canada-United States Boundary
Relations, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANISATION 522 (R.
MacDonald, G. Morris & D.Johnston eds. 1974).
169. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 5.
170. Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America on Great Lakes Water
Quality, April 15, 1972, United States-Canada, T.I.A.S. No. 7312, reprinted in 11 INT', LEGAL
MATERIALS 694 (1972). For a detailed discussion of this agreement, see Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes
Pollution: A Study in United States-Canadian Environmental Cooperation, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE
GI OBAL ENVIRONMENT 294 (J. Hargrove ed. 1972).
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flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to
the injury of health or property on the other." This language
restates the sic utere tuo principle and is just as general as that
maxim, perhaps fatally so. The treaty defines neither "pollution"
nor "injury," a lapse placing an obstacle before anyone seeking to
bring an action based upon it. The treaty's environmental
significance is also weakened by the failure of Article IV to give the
IJC (which was established by the treaty) specific power to enforce
it. Furthermore, there are questions whether Article II, the
"remedies" clause of the agreement, applies to pollution. 17 1
The Great Lakes Agreement is a far different document than
the Boundary Waters Treaty. This agreement's only concern is the
environment, and it sets up a detailed regime for protecting the
Great Lakes. It is much more representative of the body of
international water resource agreements than is the Boundary
Waters Treaty. The Great Lakes Agreement sets general and
specific water quality objectives (Articles II and III, Annex 1).
Detailed provisions and annexes set forth those programs the
parties agree to undertake to achieve the water quality objectives
(Articles IV and V, Annexes 2-8). The agreement vested the IJC
with certain authority (Article VI) and established the Great Lakes
Water Quality Board to administer and assist in accomplishing the
agreement's purposes (Article VII). Importantly, the agreement
provides for exchange of data (Article VIII) and for modification of
the water quality objectives if events so require (Article IX).
To summarize this section on treaties, "the extent of treaty
provisions dealing with pollution. . . when combined with the yet
more extensive practice dealing in general with international
streams, reinforces the conclusion that these treaties, taken as a
whole, represent international practice from which general rules of
customary international law may be deduced. "172 One of these
deducible rules places limits on the manner in which a state may
utilize an international drainage basin, particularly when a use will
harm a neighboring state's environment.

171. S. MCCAFFREY, PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR TRANSFRONTIER ENVIRONMENTAl. DISTURBANCES 92
(1975). The effectiveness of Article II has been extensively debated. See Austin, Canadian-UnitedStates
Practiceand 7heory Respecting the InternationalLaw of InternationalRivers: A Study qf the History and Influence
of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. BAR REV. 393 (1959); Bourne, 7he Columbia River Controvery, 37 CAN.
BAR REV. 444 (1959); Cohen, Some Leal and Policy Aspects of the Columbia River Dispute, 36 CAN. BAR
RFV. 25 (1958); Scott, The Canadian-American Boundary Waters Treaty: Why Article I1?, 36 CAN. BAR
REV. 511 (1958); Griffin, Problems Respecting the Availability of Remedies in Cases Relating to the Uses of
InternationalRivers, 51 PROC. AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. 36 (1957).
172. Utton, supra note 87, at 285.
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3. Publicists
Rather than examine the opinions of individual authorities
claiming that international law prohibits transboundary water
pollution, a look at organizations composed of international legal
scholars will suffice. The groups that have addressed the issue are
the Institute of International Law, the International Law
73
Association, and the International Law Commission. 1
As early as 1911 the Institute of International Law (IIL), in its
Madrid Declaration, stated that "[w]hen a stream traverses
successively the territories of two or more States... [a]ll alterations
injurious to the water [are] forbidden. "1 1

4

The IIL's 1961 Salzburg

1 75

Resolution made a similar statement,
and in 1979 the Institute
met in Athens and adopted a Resolution on the Pollution of Rivers
and Lakes and International Law. Article II of the Resolution
declares that "[s]tates shall be under a duty to ensure that their
activities or those conducted within their jurisdiction or control
cause no pollution in the waters of international rivers or lakes
beyond their boundaries. "176 A state that violates this obligation
"shall incur international liability under international law. 177
Although the International Law Association (ILA) adopted
environmentally protective articles on the uses of rivers at its 1956,
1958, and 1960 conferences,178 it was at the 1966 meeting that the
ILA adopted the important Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of
International Rivers (Helsinki
Rules).1 79 The influential
Helsinki Rules contain several explicit provisions concerning
pollution. Article IX defines "water pollution, ''180 and Article X
states:
1. Consistent with the principle of equitable
utilization of waters of an international drainage basin, a
State
(a) must prevent any new form of water pollution or
173. On the value of such organizations and of international conferences, Professor Handl has
st'itd that their work "often amount[s] to authoritative expositions of the state of the law, or, in any
C cot, given the peculiarities of the international law-making process, are highly significant in that
Ithb tetod to reflect an emerging international consensus in respect of the provisions incorporated."
Handl. supra note 79, at 59.
174. Institute of Int'l Law, Madrid Declaration, reprinted in M. WHITEMAN, supra note 95, at
921.
175. Institute of Int'l Law, Salzburg Resolution, reprinted in M. WHITEMAN, supra note 95, at
922.
176. Institute ofInt'l Law, Athens Resolution, reprinted in D. CAPONERA, supra note 61, at 282.
177. Id. at 283.
178. For a reprint of these resolutions, see M. WHITEMAN, supra Note 95, at 924-29.
179. HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, INT'L LAW Ass'N,
supra note 6. at 477.

181). "Water pollution" means "any detrimental change resulting from human conduct in the
natural composition, content, or quality ofthe waters ofan international drainage basin." Id. at 494.
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any increase in the degree of existing water pollution
in an international drainage basin which would cause
substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State,
and...
2. The rule stated in paragraph one.

.

.

applies to

water pollution originating:
(a) within a territory of the State, or
(b) outside the territory of the State, if it is caused by
the State's conduct. 181

The ILA concluded that if the article is violated, "the State
responsible shall be required to cease the wrongful conduct and
compensate the injured co-basin State for the injury that has been
caused to it. ",182
The ILA continued its work on the uses of international rivers,
and after its 1966 session expanded its efforts to include all nonmaritime water resources. In 1982 the organization adopted an
eleven article resolution 183 that seeks to elaborate and supplement
Articles X and XI of the Helsinki Rules.18 4 This resolution's first
article proclaims that "states shall.

.

.

prevent new or increased

water pollution that would cause substantial injury in the territory
of another state. "'185
The United Nations International Law Commission is
preparing draft articles that will constitute an umbrella agreement
of principles for the non-navigational uses of international
watercourses. More specifically, the Sixth Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly working on the subject agreed that:
[O]ne of the general principles of the umbrella agreement
should be that the waters of an international water course
should be regarded as a natural resource to be shared
among the riparians of that watercourse.

.

. [and] that,

pursuant to a second such principle, such water should be
equitably utilized by the riparians; and that, pursuant to
a third, no riparian should so use its share of the waters as
86
to inflict injury upon other uses. 1
181. Id. at 496-97.
182. Id. at 501.
183. INT'l. LAW ASS'N, supra note 121, at 531.

184. See Statement by C. Bourne, INT'L. LAW ASS'N, supra note 121, at 549.
185. Id. at 535.
186. 11980] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 123, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980.
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4. IntergovernmentalOrganizationsand Conferences
One can find further evidence that international law protects
international drainage basins in the work of numerous
intergovernmental organizations and conferences. The Stockholm
Environment Conference, for example, adopted a recommendation
declaring that certain principles should be followed when a water
resource is developed. Two of these principles are:
The basic objective of all water resource use and
development activities from the environmental point of
view is to ensure the best use of water and to avoid its
pollution in each country.
The net benefits of hydrographic regions common to
more than one national jurisdiction are to be shared
87
equitably by the nations affected. 1
Also, the 1977 United Nations Conference on Desertification
recommended the "wise and efficient management of shared water
resources for rational use."11 8 8 The United Nations Water
Conference at Mar del Plata that same year insisted upon the
equitable utilization of international rivers. 189 The Mar del Plata
Plan also
recommended that international organizations
implement the Stockholm recommendation referred to above' 90
and noted the need for cooperation among co-riparians if
Stockholm Principle 21 is to be realized. 191
The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee formulated
draft proposals in 1973 on the law of international rivers largely
similar to the Helsinki Rules. 92 The Council of Europe's 1967
European Water Charter' 93 and its 1974 Draft European
Convention for the Protection of International Watercourses
against Pollution 194 along with the work of the Economic
187. Report, supra note 80, at 17.
188. Report of the United Nations Conference on Desertification, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.74/36,
at20(1977).
189. Report of the United Nations Water Conference, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.70/29, at 51-54
(1977).
190. 1d. at 25.
191. Id. at 53.
192. ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION
Al
,.1 NEW DELHI 7 (1973), reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N Part 2, at 339, U.N. Doc.
4/SER.A/1974/Add. I.
193. Council of Europe, European Water Charter, reprinted in[1974] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N,
Part 2, at 342.
194. Council of Europe, Draft European Convention for the Protection of Watercourses Against
Pollution, reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, part 2, at 346. The Council of Europe's Consultative
Assembly also adopted a Draft European Convention on the Protection of Fresh Water Against
Pollution. Reprintedin 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, Part 2, at 344.
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Commission for Europe' 95 and the European Communities 1 96
represent the voice of European regional organizations in
regulating and outlawing transboundary water pollution. States on
the other side of the Atlantic have also been active in this endeavor.
Article 2 of the Montevideo Declaration, adopted in 1933 by the
Seventh International Conference of American States,' 97 prohibits
any industrial or agricultural exploitation of a watercourse that will
injure a co-riparian. The 1957 Buenos Aires Resolution of the
Inter-American Bar Association affirmed the principle of limited
sovereignty in the use of water resources,1 98 and in 1965 the InterAmerican Juridical Committee prepared a Draft Convention that
contains a clause prohibiting utilization of an international river or
lake for industrial or agricultural purposes that cause substantial
injury to co-riparian states. 199
D.

SUMMARY

The world community, as evidenced by international and
national decisions, treaties, publicists, general principles of law,
and declarations of organizations, adheres to the doctrine of limited
territorial sovereignty and has "adopted the concept of sic utere tuo
requiring a riparian to use its part of an international drainage
basin so as not to injure its coriparians. "200
Before examining some procedural rules of international
environmental law this Article will recapitulate the substantive
195. Some of this organization's work includes: Recommendation to the Economic Commission
liir Europe [ECEJ governments concerning the protection of ground and surface waters against
pollution by oil and oil products approved by the Committee on Water Problems, U.N. Doc.
E/ECE/WATER/7, Annex I (1970); Recommendation to the ECE governments concerning river
U.N.
Doc.
on Water Problems,
apprtved by the Committee
basin
lanagement,
FJECE/WATER/9, Annex 11 (1971); Recommendation to the Governments of Southern European
countries concerning selected water problems, approved by the Committee on Water Problems,
U.N. Doc. ST/ECE/WATER/6, Add. 1, at 11 (1972). For a collection of these recommendations,
see 119741 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, Part 2, at 332-34.
196. Some of the European Community's Council Directives include those of Nov. 22, 1973 on
tIhe
Approximation of the Laws of the Member States relating to Detergents, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No.
1,347) 51 (1973); Quality required of Surface Water intended for the Abstraction of Drinking Water
in the Member States, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L194) 26 (1975); ofJuly 18, 1978 on the Quality of
Fresh Waters Needing Protection or Improvement in Order to Support Fish Life, OJ. EUR. COMM.
(No. 1.222) 1 (1978); and of July 15, 1980, relating to the Quality of Fresh Water intended for
Human Consumption, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L229) 11 (1980).
197. PAN-AMERICAN UNION, SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES,
PLENARY SESSIONS, MINUTES AND ANTECEDENTS 114 (1933), reprinted in 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 52 (Supp.
1934).
198. INTER-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH CONFERENCE HEtiD) AT
BUENOS AIRES FROM 14 TO 21 NOVEMBER 1957, at 117 (1958), reprinted in M. WHITEMAN, supra note
95, at 929.
199. PAN-AMERICAN UNION,

REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN JURII)ICAL COMMITTFE ON THE

WORK AccoMPitiSHED DURING ITS 1965 MEETING 18 (1966), reprinted in 119741 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COM'N Part 2, at 349.
200. Utton, supra note 87, at 295.
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regime. The international authorities initially found that it is
unlawful under international law for a state to allow its territory to
be used to harm another state. They then determined that this
harm includes environmental damage. The authorities defined this
point more specifically, leading to the conclusion that only serious
transboundary

environmental

damage

is

prohibited.

20 1

More

particularly, an examination of the various sources of international
law indicated that international law forbids a state from using an
international drainage basin in such a way that causes serious harm
to a co-basin state. Furthermore, the law governing the use of
international drainage basins has advanced beyond this broad
prohibition with the establishment of the doctrine of equitable
utilization as one of its elements. This doctrine has refined the
principle of limited sovereignty by requiring an equitable balancing
of "all relevant factors and by comparing the benefits that would
flow from the utilization with the injury it might do to the interests
of other co-basin states. "202 Thus, even if a state's utilization of a
river causes serious harm to another state's beneficial use of the
river, the disrupting utilization might nonetheless be lawful if, after
a delicate balancing of all the factors in both states, it is determined
that such utilization of the watercourse is an equitable one. The
"reasonable man" test is thus a part of the international law of
rivers.
V. PROCEDURAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. A

STATE'S

DUTY

TO

GIVE

PRIOR

NOTIFICATION

AND

TO

EXCHANGE INFORMATION

As international water law uses the standard of reasonableness
to distinguish acceptable
from
unacceptable
uses, any
interpretation of this concept requires a state planning a project to
notify its neighbors of possible transboundary environmental
affects. But as "[e]quitable utilization requires the input of
interested parties during the planning process, "203 mere
notification is insufficient; it must be accompanied by ample
information to allow the potentially affected state the opportunity to
201. See Bourne, 7he Right to Utilize the Waters of InternationalRivers, 3 CAN. Y.B. INT'l L. 187,
208- 13 (1965); Bourne, InternationalLaw and Pollution of InternationalRivers and Lakes, 21 U. TORONTO
I..J 193, 196-97(1971).
202. Bourne, Canada and the Law of International Drainage Basins, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
INTFRNATIONAL LAW AND OROANISATION 468, 475 (R. MacDonald, G. Morris & D. Johnston eds.

1974).
203. Utton, supra note 87, at 308.

638

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

60:603

fully understand what risks the project entails. Without
information, such a state will be unable to competently protest
project or negotiate its modification. To be meaningful,
obligation of prior notification must be accompanied
information. These initiatives are international legal duties:

full
the
the
by

First, international law imposes [upon] a basin state the
obligation to give prior notice of works or utilizations of
waters that it proposes to undertake....
Second, international law imposes on a basin state
that wishes to undertake a work or utilization that might
cause serious injury to co-basin states the obligation to
give them sufficient information so that they may
20 4
appreciate the true nature of the proposed undertaking.
This pronouncement finds support in various sources of
international law. The ILA in its 1982 Rules of International Law
Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, which "restate general
international law as actually existing,

2

05

proclaims:

States planning to carry out activities which might
entail a significant risk of transfrontier pollution shall give
early notice to States likely to be affected. In particular
they shall on their own initiative or upon request of the
potentially affected States, communicate such pertinent
information as will permit the recipient to make an
assessment of the probable effects of the planned
activities.

206

Also in 1982, the ILA adopted Rules on Water Pollution in an
International Drainage Basin, which contain similar procedural
requirements specifically for international drainage basins. 20 7 The
ILA's work affirms similar enunciations by other groups of legal

20 8
and 1979 Athens 20 9
authorities, such as the IIL's 1961 Salzburg
Resolutions and the Inter-American Juridical Committee's 1965
210
Draft Convention.
204. Bourne, Procedurein the Development fInternationalDrainage Basins, 22 U. ToRONTO L.J. 172,
204-05 (1972). These requirements are also a duty of general international environmental law. See
Handl, supra note 79, at 61; Bothe, Transfrontier Environmental Management, in TRENDS IN
ENVIRONMENrA. POLICY AND LAW 391, 394 (M. Bothe ed. 1980).
205. INT't. LAW Ass'N, supra note 121, at 158.

206. Id. at 171.
207. Id. at 540.
208. Salzburg Resolution, supra note 175.
209. Athens Resolution, supra note 176.

210. PAN-AMERICAN UNION, supra note 199, at_
Part 2, at 349.

, reprinted in

119741 2 Y.B. INT't L. COMM'N
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There are a large number of treaties regulating international
watercourses and drainage basins, 21

1

and many contain clauses

explicitly requiring prior notification and information exchange.
Even those treaties and agreements that do not explicitly require
these duties do so implicitly by establishing a regulatory body for
the subject watercourse. These administrative commissions
typically include members from all the parties to the agreement. An
important part of the work of these institutions is to acquire
knowledge about the basin and distribute it to the parties to the
agreement. It is through the work of the river commissions that the
member states will comply with their duty to give prior notification
and share information.
The consistent use of notification and information exchange
provisions in many treaties is an important source of law because
such consistency may create or represent a rule of customary
international law. 2 12 And indeed, such consistency has occurred:
There is no longer any question that modern treaty
practice incorporates the duty to exchange information
and to notify other states of plans, projects and activities
that may affect them adversely. This duty of exchange
and notification is readily perceived in the case of...
largescale waterworks, diversions, or irrigation projects
whose effects are widespread....

211

United States-Canadian relations produced examples of
agreements that require the duties under consideration. The Great
Lakes Agreement2 1 4 between these two nations contains numerous
notice and information provisions as does their Columbia River
Treaty of 1961 .215 Furthermore, the constant use of the IJC under
the Boundary Waters Treaty has involved Canada and the United
States in a longstanding practice of prior notification and exchange
of information.

21

6

211. See supra note 164.
212. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
213. Teclaff & Teclaff, Transboundary Ground Water Pollution: Survey and Trends in Treaty Law, 19
NAi. RKSOURCESJ. 629, 663 (1979).
214. Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 170.
215. Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada relating to Cooperative
l)vclpntent of the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961, United States(:ttda.
15 U.S.T. 1555, 542 U.N.T.S. 244.
216. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 5. For a short discussion of the IJC cases up to 1964,
IM
I. WHTrFMAN, supra note 95, at 826-71. For a more current synopsis of the IJC work, see
Bcattprc. A Survey of Water and Air Pollution Cases Involving the InternationalJointCommission (CanadaUnt'rd States), in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN FRONTIER REGIONS 439 (Org. for Econ. Coopwtlation

& Dev. ed. 1979).
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These same procedural duties have been espoused by various
international organizations. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has issued recommendations
advocating the notice and information rule, 217 as has the United
Nations General Assembly2 18 and the Asian-African Legal
Consultative Committee.

219

Principle 6 of the United Nations

Environment Programme's Draft Principles on Shared Natural
Resources states that "[i]t is necessary" for a state "to notify in
advance"
other states of projects likely to affect their
environment.

22 0

Recommendation

51(b)(i)

of the

Stockholm

Conference states: "Nations agree that when major water resource
activities are contemplated that may have a significant
environmental effect on another country, the other country should
be notified well in advance of the activity envisaged."

22

1

Many courts adhere to the notification and information
exchange rules in national decisions, such as those of the United
States Supreme Court, 222 arbitral decisions, such as the Lake Lanoux
arbitration, 22 3 and in rulings of the ICJ. The World Court in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases224 and in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Cases22 5 proclaimed that states must enter good faith negotiations

with regard to certain disputes. Although this Article will look
closer at these decisions shortly, they are pertinent to this
discussion, for if the duty to negotiate is to be meaningful
and conducted with the requisite good faith, prior notification and
exchange of information are conditions precedent to effective
226
compliance with this requirement. The ICJ's Corfu Channel
217. OECD Doc. C(74)224 (Nov. 21, 1974), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 242 (1975);
OECD Doc. C(77)28(FINAL) (May 23, 1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 977 (1977).
Article 8(a) of the latter document states: "The Country of origin, on its own initiative or at the
request of an exposed Country, should communicate to the latter appropriate information
concerning it in matters of transfrontier pollution or signitficant risk of such pollution and enter into
consultations with it." Id. at __ , 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 982.
218. G.A. Res. 2995, supra note 102, at 42; G.A. Res. 3129, supra note 104, at 339-40; G.A.
Res. 3281, supra note 105.
219. ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, supra note 192, reprinted in 1974J 2 Y.B.
INT'L LAW COMM'N, Part 2, at 339, U.N. Doc. 4/SER. A/1974/Add. 1.
220. United Nations Env't Programme, Draft Principles on Shared Natural Resources, reprinted
in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1098 (1978).
221. Report, supra note 80, at 17.
222. E.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 656 (1945); Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S.
573, 585-86 (1936).
223. 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281, 24 I.L.R. 101 (Lake Lanoux Arbitral Tribunal). The Lake
Lanoux award "does intimate that there is a general principle of custonary international law
requiring states to take the interests of co-basin states into consideration and that this necessarily
leads to the obligation to give notice, to consult and to negotiate." Bourne, supra note 204, at 197.
224. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4
(Judgment of Feb. 20).
225. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of.July 25); Fisheries
Jurisdiction (W. Ger. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 175 (Judgment ofJuly 25).
226. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
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decision also lends some support to the rule that a state has an
obligation to notify co-basin states of a potentially harmful situation
in its territory.
The duty to give prior notice of a drainage basin development
and to exchange data about it is not absolute; that is, a state is not
so bound when its proposed project would not affect a co-basin state
nor when any affect from it would be insubstantial. Only if it is
likely that the transfrontier pollution will be materially damaging
are the procedural duties activated. The prior discussion of the
"substantial injury" requirement 227 also supports the proposition
that the procedural obligations do not arise until the same threshold
is met.
Conditioning an obligation in such a manner has obvious
faults. Who is to decide a project's potential for environmental
harm? Is the state proposing to act as its own judge? Who is to
quantify the harm likely to occur? What if the state proposing the
project erroneously concludes there is no possibility of serious
harm? Or, what if such a conclusion is correct but the exposed state
believes it is wrong? International law has not advanced enough to
adequately respond to these queries. It imposes no duty on states to
resolve such problems in any particular way, except that they must
do so peaceably. No state can be forced before the ICJ or an
arbitration tribunal. Ideally, all major river systems ought to have a
commission composed of representatives from the states through
which it flows. Such a commission should be reasonably
independent and authorized to regulate the basin so that it is
utilized to ensure optimal benefits and that all riparians share its
advantages equitably. Furthermore, the commission ought to be
empowered to decide disputes and issue binding orders. With its
knowledge and experience of the scientific, economic, and social
factors within the basin it would more likely render a wise decision
than a body, such as the ICJ, unfamiliar with such important
factors for determing equitable utilization.
Although international law leaves the questions posed above
largely unanswered, it responds to other issues. First, international
law indicates that states, for practical reasons, should perform the
notice and information duties in writing, not orally. 218 Second, the
notice and information must be timely and complete. The
timeliness requirement 22 9 is necessary to ensure that the recipient
has an opportunity to study the proposed utilization and make its
227. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
228. Bourne, supra note 204, at 178.
229. For detailed remarks on this point, see Bourne, supra note 204, at 178-80.
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response before the project proceeds. The aim of the timeliness
duty is to assure that a state is not faced with transfrontier pollution
that is fait accompli. In two recent promulgations of rules of
230
international law the ILA required that notice be given "early"
and in "due time." ' 231 The recipient state is also under a time
requirement: it must respond within a reasonable time so that the
232
project is not unneccessarily delayed.
The type of information to be communicated, in the words of a
committee of the Economic Commission for Europe, should be
such "as would enlighten [the recipient state] as to the nature of
[the] repercussions 21 33 likely to occur in its territory. On this point
the ILA concludes that international law requires the information
to contain "such pertinent information as will permit the recipient
to make an assessment of the probable effects of the planned
activities' 234 and also that "all relevant" 23 5 facts be given. What is
relevant can only be determined in light of the facts of each case.
There is a movement within the world community toward
requiring states to carry out environmental impact assessments
once a project for the utilization of a natural resource had been
devised and to include in this study the project's transboundary
effects. This developing concept has some relevance to the kind of
information that should be exchanged, that is, the full results of the
environmental statement ought to be an essential part of the
information communicated.
Article 7(2) of the ILA's Rules on Transfrontier Pollution
states: "In order to appraise whether a planned activity implies a
significant risk of transfrontier pollution, States should make
23 6
environmental assessments before carrying out such activities. ,
The use of "should" makes the provision merely advisory.
Comment 15 to Article 7(2) states that environmental assessment
"as a rule of international law is in the stage of development.' '237
The concept has obvious value and has been advocated by the
230. INT'L LAwAss',, supra note 121, at 171.
231. Id. at 540.
232. Handl, supra note 79, at 62. In support of the proposition that lie recipient state must
respond within a reasonable time, Handl cited Recommendation 51 of the Siockholoh Confience
and "international agreements." Id. (citing OECD Doc. C(74)224 (Nov. 21, 1974)). Proiessor
Handl goes on to state that "the acting state need only wait for a reasonable period of tiie bcflr it
can go ahead with the project on the assumption that the absence of a response after such a titie
indicates the absence of objections." Id.
233. Committee on Electric Power of the Economic Commission 6Ir Europe, U.N. Do(-.
E/ECE/EP/135 (1953).
234. laxT'.
LAw Ass's, supra note 121, at 171.
235. Id.at 540.
236. Id. at 171.
237. Id.at 174.
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,2 38 the
European Communities Commission,2 3 9 and the United Nations
Environment Programme. 240 Although Recommendations 60 and
61 of the United Nations Stockholm Conference concern
environmental assessments

in

general,241 Recommendation

48

specifically addresses water resources. It suggests that:
Governments, and the Secretary-General in co-operation
with the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the
United Nations and other United Nations organisations
concerned, as well as development assistance agencies,
take steps to ensure international co-operation in the
research, control and regulation of the side effects of
national activities in resource utilization where these
affect the aquatic resources of other nations .... 242

Professor Handl argues that the prohibition against
transboundary environmental damage "presupposes compliance
with a duty of assessment of potential transnational effects of
contemplated national activity." 243 He adds that the duty "could
be inferred from the general proposition that states are under an
obligation to consider possibly conflicting interests of other states
244 As cogent
and attempt to reconcile them with their own. ,,
as this
reasoning is, international law does not yet recognize, as Professor
Handl admits, 245 a duty to complete environmental impact
statements prior to a water resource project.
In contrast to international law, the law of the United States
requires consideration of the transboundary environmental effects
24 6
of a national activity.
238. Strengthening International Co-Operation on Environmental Protection in Frontier
Regions, OECD Doc. C(78) 77 (Final) (Sept. 21, 1978), reprinted in ORG. FOR EcONONIte CoOPERATION AND DEV., OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT 120 (1979).
239. Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the Assessment of the Environmental Effects
of certain Private and Public Projects, submitted by the Commission to the Council, June 16, 1980,
O.J. EUR. CoMM.(No. C169) 14(1980).
240. 197 Draft Principles on Shared Natural Resources, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.12/2 (1978),
reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1097 (1978). Principle 4 states: "States should make
environmental assessments before engaging in any activity with respect to a shared natural resource
which may create a risk of significantly affecting the environment of another State or States sharing
that resource." Id.,
reprintedin 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALSat 1098 (footnote omitted).
241. Report, supra note 80, at 19.
242. Id. at 16.
243. Handl, supra note 79, at 57.
244. Id.at 62.
245. Id. at 56.
246. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat. 498 (superceded 1972)
(contains notice and consultation provisions); National Environmental Policy Act ol 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (requires that
environmental impact statements include an assessment of the transboundary impact potential of
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STATE'S DUTY TO NEGOTIATE AND TO CONSULT

"With respect to the use of the waters of international
drainage basins the principle of consultation and negotiation has
become a rule of customary international law . ... "247 Judicial
decisions, treaty terms, state practice, declarations and statements
of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the
opinion of publicists all support this conclusion. After a diligent
study of this issue Canadian scholar Charles Bourne determined
that international law requires negotiation and consultation. 24 8 To
substantiate this determination he traced the origin of the rule to a
1923 convention and cited many post-1923 sources of law.
/ Since Bourne's study there have been a number of
developments that more firmly establish the consultation and
negotiation obligations. 249 For example, Article 6 of the ILA's
water pollution rules declares:
Basin states shall consult one another on actual or
potential problems of water pollution in the drainage
basin so as to reach, by methods of their own choice, a
solution consistent with their rights and duties under
international law. This consultation, however, shall not
unreasonably delay the implementation of plans that are
the subject of consultation.

250

any project under review).
For two articles on NEPA's applicability outside of lie United States, see Brower, /sNl P I
Exportable?, 43 ALB. L. REV. 513 (1979); Yost, American Governmental Rlcpan.ihiliy./r Environmental
Effects ofActions Abroad, 43 ALB. L. REV. 528 (1979).
Also on the United States requirement for international environmtental impact stitemtents, see
Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 354 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321, at 515-17 (1982).
Additionally, in 1978 (he United States Senate passed a resolution calling lot- ; glbal "'rcaty oil
International Environmental Assessments. S. Res. 49, 95ti Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoN(;. REC.
S II, 523-24 (daily ed. July 21, 1978).
247. INT'L LAW Ass'N, supra note 121, at 175. IProlessor Bilder, writing in 1976, was only willing
to state that there is a "growing consensus that co-riparian States" oughl I et teiiiioISaLiiis
and
negotiations. Bilder, supra note 164, at 180. Proflessor Blithe, writing several years later, argued thalt
negotiation and consultation are general duties that arise in all cases where translfromier pollution
has occurred or is likely to occur land) ... I t1his duty is particularly well established for shared water
resources." Bothe, supra note 204, at 395.
248. Bourne, Procedure in the Development of International DrainageBasins: /Te Duty to Consult and to
Negotiate, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 212 (1972).
249. See Report, supra note 80, at 7; G.A. Res. 3129, supra note 104, at 49; G.A. Res. 3281. supra
note 105, at 52; OECD Doc. C(74)224 (Nov. 21, 1974), reprinted in 14 INr'L LE;AtL MAERIALS242.
246 (1975); Proposition 10 ol'the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee's drali proposals oi
international rivers, ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGA CONsULrArTIvE COXIMTTEi , supra note 192, at 13: United
Nations Environment Programme, Drafi Principles live and six oitshared natural resources, reprinted
in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1091, 1097 (1978); Council of Europe, 1974 Drali Europeani
Convention fbr the Protection o International Watercourses Against IPllution, 11974J 2 Y.B. INr'
.. COMNt'N 346, U.N. Doc. 4/SER.A/1974/Add.1; Institute of International Law, Athens
Resthinonit (1979), reprinted in D. CAPONERA, supra note 61, at 282.
250. IN'r'L LAv Ass'N, supra note 121, at 541.
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Important evidence for the proposition that states have a duty
to consult and negotiate is the long-standing consistent pattern of
state practice in consulting and negotiating when problems have
arisen over the exploitation of a common water resource 251 and the
252
fact that many water resource treaties impose such obligations.
Although the ICJ in its Corfu Channel opinion may have
implicity required consultation in situations that may cause injury
to another state, 253 the court clearly required this in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases and in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases. The
former case concerned the delimitation of the North Sea that
appertains to each of the litigants, West Germany, Denmark, and
the Netherlands. The ICJ held that the states were obligated to
negotiate in good faith in an attempt to settle their dispute. 254 A
factor that led the court to this conclusion is the unity of deposits
of natural resources in the subsoil of the sea, a fact strikingly similar
to the unity of water in an international water basin and one that
allowed the ICJ to reason as follows:
The nature of the two situations is sufficiently
analogous so that, if there is an obligation of international
law to negotiate continental shelf boundaries, taking the
unity of resource deposits into account, there is equally an
obligation under international law to negotiate with
255
respect to the apportionment of the use of water.
The FisheriesJurisdiction Cases addressed the rights of Iceland,
West Germany, and the United Kingdom to exploit fish off the
Icelandic coast. Rather than determine these rights, the ICJ
ordered the states to seek a resolution through good faith
negotiations. 25 6 This case is especially relevant to a study of the
negotiations requirement because the court was faced with the
problem of apportioning a natural resource, which is essentially
what must be done in determining whether an international water
resource is being equitably utilized.
The broad statement that there is a responsibility to negotiate
251. Bothe, supra note 204, at 394; Bourne, supra note 248, at 220; Utton, supra [ote 87, at 307;
Handl, supra note 79, at 59.
252. See Florio, Water Pollution and Related Principles of InternationalLaw, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
134, 142 (1979); B. CHAUHAN, supra note 154, at 277-80.
253. Bilder, supra note 164, at 158. It has been argued that the obiter dicta of the Lake Lanoux
arbitration "suggest that a duty to consult and negotiate with a co-basin state is a general principle of
international law." Bourne, supra note 248, at 219.
254. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4, 4647, 53-54 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
255. [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 171, U.N. Doc. 4/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1.
256. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3, 31-33 (judgment of July 25).

646

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:603

and consult gives little indication what these duties entail. To be
25
meaningful, the obligations must be carried out in good faith. 1
Good faith itself has ramifications. It requires that the consultations
and negotiations be carried out for a reasonable time, that they not
be unjustifiably broken off or delayed, and that the parties adhere
to agreed procedures.2 5 8 The disputing states must take account of
one another's various interests. 259 Each state is under "an
obligation to accept in good faith all communication and contacts
which could . . . provide States with the best conditions for
concluding agreements. ,26 0 In addition, the parties must negotiate
with the object of reaching an agreement, 26 1 even if there is no
obligation to actually reach an agreement. 262 The requirement that
consultation and negotiation be meaningfully conducted can be
summarized by the words of the ICJ:
[T]he parties are under an obligation to enter into
negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement, and
not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation . . .; they are under an obligation so to conduct
themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which
will not be the case when either of them insists upon its
own position without contemplating any modification of
it

. ...

263

Although there is some authority for requiring that co-basin states
unable to reach an agreement over the utilization of a drainage
basin must resort to third parties to settle the dispute, either by
mediation, conciliation, or adjudication, such an obligation is not
264
yet recognized by international law.
VI. RESOLVING U.S. -

CANADIAN CONFLICTS

The procedural duties discussed above can be summarized as
257. Bourne, supra note 248, at 223-25.
258. See, e.g., INT'L L. Ass'N, RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO TRANSFRoN'II-R
POLLUTION, art. 8 (1), reprinted in INT'L LAw ASS'N, supra note 121, at 175; Article 6 of the Institute of

International Law's Salzburg Resolution, 56 Am.J. INT'L L. 738 (1962).
259. 12 R. int'l Arb. Awards 281, 303, 24 I.L.R. 101, 128 (Lake Lanoux Arbitral Tribunal,
1957).
260. 12 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 281, 308; 24 I.L.R. 101, 130 (Lake Lanoux Arbitral Tribunal,
1957).
261. Continental Shelf' Cases, 1969 I.C.J., at 48; Railway Traffic between Poland and
Lithuania, 1931 P.C.l.J., ser. A/B, No. 42, at 116(Judgment of Oct. 15).
262. Bourne, supra note 248, at 225-31.
263. Continental Shelf'Cases, 1969 I.C.J., at 47.
264. See Bourne, Mediation, Conciliation and Adjudication in theSettlement of International Drainage
Basin Disputes,9 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 114(1971L.
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the responsibility of states to cooperate when a disagreement arises
over the use of an international drainage basin. Has the United
States cooperated with Canada in the development of Garrison
Diversion? If so, has this cooperation been sufficient to meet the
strictures of international procedural law? It is beyond the scope of
this Article to answer these questions thoroughly. Nonetheless, a
few general remarks on them will be made.
The United States did not negotiate with its northern neighbor
about Garrison Diversion either when the project was proposed or
before construction began. Furthermore, the United States does
not seem to have given Canada information and effective notice of
the project prior to the beginning of construction in 1967. But it is
debatable whether the procedural duties or notification, exchange
of information, negotiation, and consultation were indeed
obligations of international law in 1967. After 1967 and prior to the
IJC study of GDU, the United States discussed the water project
with Canada and gave it information about this utilization of the
water resource the two states share. 26 5 In fact, it was data supplied
by the United States Bureau of Reclamation that led to Canada's
266
early formal objections.
International legal duties were surely adhered to by the United
States when it agreed to refer the matter to the IJC, thereby
allowing Canada full access to all facts about the project. Resort to
the IJC was in the finest spirit of international cooperation. After
the IJC's findings were issued, work on Garrison Diversion
stopped. Although not wholly due to the United States' respect for
Canadian interests, halting the project was in part respective of
these interests and was in conformance with the law of the world
community.
Since issuance of the ICJ's report in 1977, and prior to the
formation of the GDUC in 1984, the United States appears to
have, by various means, continued to comply with its procedural
obligations of notification, exchange of information, negotiation,
and consultation. First, the United States decided to develop a
closed system. 267 Second, discussions between the two countries on
the water project have proceeded at high levels. In the past few
years Secretary of State George Schultz has met eight times with his
Canadian counterpart and the GDU was on the agenda each time
and discussed at length in several meetings. 268 The Canadian
265. Nossal, supra note 3, at 3-7.
266. Id. at 4.
267. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
268. Statement of Mr. Carroll Brown, Director, Office of Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department
of Slaw. belore the Garrison Commission (Aug. 30, 1984).
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Environment Minister has gone to Washington to exchange views
on the project with the Secretary of Interior.2 69 Third, for several
years there has been in operation a formal deliberative body, the
Garrision
Consultative
Group
(Group),
composed of
representatives of the two countries.27 0 In Canada's opinion the
Group has operated "effectively," 2 7' 1 and Canada has proposed
"that future consultations proceed under the aegis of this
Group. 27 2 This is an indication that Canada is satisfied with the
Group as a mechanism by which the United States heeds its
procedural duties. Because protection of Canadian interests
involves many technical matters, a Garrison Joint Technical
Committee (Committee) of three Canadians and three Americans
has been set up within the Group. 27 3 The Committee, composed of
four specialized Task Forces, monitors GDU features under
planning, design, and contruction as well as the plans for future
274
development, all in an effort to meet Canadian concerns.
Indeed, progress has been made. The Committee reports: "A
number of modifications have been made to the design features
with the potential for impact on Canada as a result of
deliberations of the Committee and its Task Force. "275 A
Canadian official has remarked that the United States has
developed "innovative engineering solutions'' 2 76 and that Canada
is "impressed by the thoroughness, competence and talent of the
engineers and biologists in developing and implementing design
solutions" 277 that seek to satisfy Canadian worries. Consequently,
Canadian objections to Phase 1 have been almost entirely
eliminated. 278 With regard to Phase 2, Canadian concerns persist,
but even here agreements reached between Canada and the United
269. Id.
270. Bismarck Tribune, Aug. 21, 1984, at lB, col. 5.
271. Canada Diplomatic Note No. 693, at 2-3 (Dec. 12, 1984) (a copy of this note is on tile with
the author).
272. Id. at 3.
273. See Report of the Garrison Joint Technical Committee to the Consultative Group on the
Garrison Project 2 (Apr. 18, 1984),
274. Id. The Task Forces are: Biota and Fisheries, Wildlife Mitigation, Engineering, and Wcst
Oakes Research Activities. Id. at 2-3.
275. Id. at 2.
276. Presentation of the Government of Canada to Secretarial Commission tor the Garrison
Unit: Technical Concerns 6-7 (Sept. 11, 1984).
277. Id. at 6. A representative of various Canadian groups opposing the GDU, testifying befbre
the GDUC, listed several of the United States responses to Canadian demands and remarked that
these "are all excellent examples of the time, money and effort that has been spent by the U.S.
Department of Interior in attempting to deal with Canadian concerns .... " Testimony of Bruce
Popka, 2 Transcript of Proceedings in the Matter of the Public Meeting before the Garrison
Diversion Unit Commission 37 (Sept. 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as GDUC Transcript]. He also
recognized that "large sums of money have been spent on studying... [the leaching process of soil
chemicals in irrigation drainage] and on designing means by which the chemicals in the water can be
reduced." Id. at 39.
278. Statement of Carroll Brown, supra note 268, at 7.
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States have reduced Canadian objections to this phase. 279
Further compliance with international procedural law by the
United States has resulted due to the nature of the United States'
system of government. Thus, Canadian opponents to Garrison
have been allowed to express their opinions before congressional
subcommittees and have been able to conduct concerted lobbying
efforts in Washington to halt North Dakota's water project. 28 0 It is
probably true that the United States, more than any other nation,
allows foreign nationals and governments the widest, least
restricted opportunity to present their opinions to United States
decisionmakers.
The GDUC is the most recent manifestation of the United
States' adherence to international law. Congress directed the
GDUC
"to
examine,
review,
evaluate,
and make
recommendations with regard to the contemporary water needs
of

.

.

.

North

Dakota,

taking

into consideration

.

.

.

the

international impacts of the water development alternatives . . .
and make recommendations to reduce and minimize those
impacts. '281 Although Congress also instructed the GDUC to
address a number of other issues of the GDU controversy, based
upon comments made by senators in the debate prior to acceptance
of the GDUC idea, it appears that transboundary implications
were to receive prominent consideration.

28 2

Canada was not consulted as to the wisdom of creating the
GDUC or as to its mandate.

28 3

During the selection process of

GDUC members, Canada was not consulted, and although "some
Canadian officials did broach the subject • of Canadian
representation on the commission . . . those efforts were
rebuffed. 2 8 4 None of these points, however, are violative of

international law. Besides, as the GDUC was mandated to consider
Canadian concerns, little more could have been achieved by
Canada had it been consulted about the formation and powers of

the GDUC. Furthermore, procedural international law does not
require that a foreign nation be represented on a body such as the
GDUC, formed by a nation, even if the body is established to
address a transfrontier issue affecting the foreign state.
The GDUC, as directed, considered Canadian concerns, and
279.
author).
280.
281.
282.
Burdick,
283.
284.

Canada Diplomatic Note No. 465 (Aug. 24, 1984) (a copy of this note is on tile with the
Testimony of Gerry McKinney, GDUC Transcript, supra note 277, at 31.
Act ofJuly 16, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-360, § 207(c)(2)(K), 98 Stat. 403, 412.
See 130 CONG. REC. S7924-7928 (daily ed. June 21, 1984) (Statements of Sens. Andrews,
Proxmire, Stafford, and Percy).
Letter from Sen. Mark Andrews to the author (Sept. 10, 1984) (on file with the author).
Id.
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significantly, the United States suspended work on the project
while the GDUC deliberated.2 85 The governments of Canada and
Manitoba,
Canadian
environmental
groups,
and other
representatives of Canadian interests were allowed to present
written submissions to the GDUC and to testify at its public
hearings. This access was the same as that given Garrison
advocates. In its deliberations the GDUC gave close attention to
the transboundary problems.2 8

states:

"International

6

The Final Report of the GDUC

impacts of biota transfer and irrigation

return flows were considered in all alternatives .

. .

and were given

serious consideration in the decisionmaking process of the
Commission. The Commission believes that its [recommended]
plan satisfies all Canadian concerns ....
,,217 Canada, in its
reactions to the GDUC deliberations, apparently agrees that its
2
interests have been respected .

88

Thus, the United States seems to have adhered to
international law's procedural obligations. This is only a tentative
conclusion, however, for this aspect of the international legal
elements of Garrison Diversion has not been closely studied here.
Furthermore, the project goes on. The GDUC's Final Report
states that "continued diplomatic consultations are necessary
during project implementation,"

289

and Canada has already listed

a number of specific areas of the project design upon which it
desires to consult. 290 International procedural law, therefore, will
continue to impose duties upon the United States.
In its development of the GDU the United States has not
breached its substantive duty to prevent transboundary
environmental damage. But this too is a tentative conclusion, for
the project is not yet operative. If damage to Canadian waters
results, the United States might be responsible for the harm under
international law if 1) the harm is serious and 2) a balancing of all
relevant factors in both states proves that Garrison Diversion is an
inequitable use of the water resource the two nations share. What
these factors might involve has been studied by the ILA and listed
in Article 5 of the Helsinki Rules.2 9 1 Stated generally, the factoranalysis approach of Article 5 seeks to determine:
285. Bismarck Tribune, Aug. 26, 1984, at IA, col. 5.
286.

See GARRISON

DIVERSION

UNIT

COMM'N,

INTERIM

STAFF

RP'ORI

ON

ISSUES

,ANI)

ALTERNATIVES 14-18 (Nov. 7, 1984).
287. GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT COMM'N, supra note 53, at 53.

288. See Canada Diplomatic Note No. 63, supra note 271; McGregor, Canada Sets TeriLs on
Garrison Project, Grand Forks Herald, Nov. 22, 1984, at IA, col. 3.
289. GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT COM'N, supra note 53, at 53.
290. Canada Diplomatic Nole No. 693, supra note 271, at 3.
291. HELSINKI RULES, supra note 179. Article Five states:
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[Wjhether (i) the various uses are compatible, (ii) any of
the uses is essential to human life, (iii) the uses are socially
and economically valuable, (iv) other resources are
available, (v) any of the uses is "existing" within the
meaning of Article VIII, (vi) it is feasible to modify
competing uses in order to accommodate all to some
degree, (vii) financial contributions by one or more of the
interested basin States for the construction of works could
result in the accommodation of competing uses, (viii) the
burden could be adjusted by the payment of
compensation to one or more of the co-basin States, and
(ix) overall efficiency of water utilization could be
improved in order to increase the amount of available
water. 292
If Canadian waters are eventually damaged by GDU, a tribunal
would likely be called to determine whether the United States had
complied with substantive international environmental law. The
would likely be based on the above factors.
determination
Although none of the criteria are preeminent, Article 8 of the
Helsinki Rules gives some preference to existing uses. 29 3 The
provision seems to require protection of an existing reasonable use
where a study of all the factors in the two nations indicates that
neither nation's interests predominate. Thus, if it were determined
(1) What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of Article IV is
to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the
drainage area in the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water
by each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular
existing utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(1) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and
social needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters ofthe basin;
j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a
means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without
causing substantial injury to a co-basin State;
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable
and equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion
reached on the basis of the whole.
Id.
292. Id. at 488-89.
293. Id. at 493.
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that Canadian water quality, water quantity, fishing, and
waterfowl interests are not of equal or greater value than the
interests of the United States in irrigated farm land and augmented
municipal and industrial water supplies, then the harm caused by
Garrison Diversion would not violate international law. As a result,
Canada would have to suffer impairment of its water uses even
though it might be entitled to some monetary compensation for its
loss.
Determining the substantive legality of a fully functioning
GDU would be a difficult task. It is doubtful that the interests of
Canada would clearly prevail over those of the United States, and
vice versa. That Article 5 criteria involve some issues requiring
scientific determinations does not necessarily make reaching a
decision any easier, for scientists often reach different conclusions
upon similar facts. Furthermore, many of the factors will require a
subjective determination.
Assuming Garrison Diversion eventually harms Canada and
substantially so, what are Canada's remedies? Can sanctions be
imposed on the United States? This point can be addressed both
from the perspective of a Canadian citizen who has been
individually damaged and from that of Canada as a sovereign
nation.
No rule of public international law gives a foreign national an
international forum in which to sue the United States or any
governmental body within it. Article 34(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice states: "Only States may be parties
in cases before the Court. ' 294 Nor could an individual bring the
United States before an arbitration tribunal. 295 A Canadian
citizen's only recourse, other than seeking his government's direct
intervention, is in private international law, that is, within the
municipal legal systems of Canada and the United States. 296 There
is a dearth of decisions involving pollution crossing the CanadaUnited States border. Yet a private tort action brought either in
Canadian or United States courts might well result in an effective
remedy and ought to be given more consideration than such
approaches have received in the past. This is so even if such an
attempt is fraught with more than a little uncertainty.
If a Canadian citizen brought suit in his own country's court
he would have to overcome problems concerning sovereign
294. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 59, at 395.

295. See id.
296. See S. MCCAFFREY, supra note 171, at 70; McCaffrey, Trans-Boundary Pollution
hqiuries:
JurisdictionalConsiderationsin Private Litigation Between Canada and the United States, 3 CAi.. W. INT'rl L.J.
191 (1973).
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immunity, extraterritorial service of process, and establishment of
personal jurisdiction by the court over the defendant. If these
problems were solved the court would then be required to
determine whether it is bound to apply Canadian law, United
States law, or some fusion thereof. If the Canadian citizen received
a favorable verdict he may well have to start a second proceeding in
a United States court to enforce it. Although the United States
Supreme Court has ruled that foreign judgments should be
recognized as a matter of comity among nations, 296 a United States
court could well determine that enforcing the judgment would be
inimical to American interests. It is unlikely that an American
court would recognize a Canadian court's injunction ordering the
cessation of a fully operative GDU. On the other hand, a United
States court would give more respect to a monetary damage
award 298
If the injured Canadian were to sue in the United States the
foremost issue would be whether an American court has
jurisdiction of actions to recover for damage to foreign land.
Professor McCaffrey studied this issue and concluded:
There

is

.

.

.

ample

American

precedent

for

entertaining jurisdiction of actions to recover for damage
to foreign land when the injury was caused by an act
committed within the court's jurisdiction. Since a court
with power over the person of the defendant can grant
effective relief, the fact that the injured land was located
in Canada would probably make no difference.

299

The Canadian litigant in a United States court will be faced
with practical problems of expense, unfamiliarity with United
States law and procedure, and perhaps a bias against his position.
Despite these problems and others mentioned above, a private suit
might succeed. Consideration ought to be given to private actions
should Garrison Diversion prove environmentally harmful to
Canada. The Canada-United States boundary seems to have a
mystique; it somehow prevents a pollution victim from taking
direct legal action in national courts and under municipal law. It
need not be so inhibiting. Indeed, a private action might be a more
297. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1885).
298. On the entbrcement of foreign judgments by American courts, see Kulzer, Some Aspects oJ
Enforceability of Foretgnjudgments, 16 BUFF. L.R. 84 (1966); Note, The Enforceability of ForeignJudgments
in American Courts, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 8 (1961); Reese, The Status in this Country ofJudgments
RenderedAbroad, 50 COL. L.R. 783 (1950).
299. S. MCCAFFREY, supra note 171, at 70 (1975).
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effective response than Canada as a sovereign nation seeking to
recover for environmental damage done to its territory by Garrison
Diversion.
If Canada were to seek to recover for environmental damage
caused by the Garrison Diversion project it would be confronted
initially with the rule, as enunciated by the Permanent Court of
International Justice, that "no State can, without its consent, be
compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to
mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific
settlement."

30 0

Yet a state is bound to settle its disputes with other

states peaceably. Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter
(Charter) states: "All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security,

and justice, are not endangered."

' 30

'

The

means of peaceably settling a Garrison Diversion dispute include
continuing negotiations, and if these fail, seeking resolution
through intermediary procedures. These procedures may be formal
or informal, but are not binding and stop short of judicial
settlement and arbitration. They include such mechanisms as good
offices, mediation, conciliation, and inquiry, and any other form of
third party assistance aimed at helping the disputants reach an
acceptable solution. The intermediary might be another nation that
Canada and the United States respect and that has experience in
international law and disputes, such as the United Kingdom. The
third party could also be a statesman or an international body, such
as the United Nations or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. As environmental problems are often
made complex by scientific factors, the aid of a scientific
organization such as the International Council of Scientific -Unions
and its Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment,
might be requested.
Should intermediary measures not be used, or if they fail,
settlement by the ICJ or an arbitration tribunal are the final
possibilities for peaceful settlement.3 0 2 The IC.J "is open to the
300. Advisory Opinion Concerning the Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C. I.J. ser. B, No. 5,
at 27 (Judgment ofJuly 23).
301. U.N. C HARTERart. 2, para. 3.
302. G. SC 11WARZENBERGER & E. BROWN. MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (6th ed. 1976).
The authors state as follows:
Arbitration differs from mediation and conciliation in the duty incumbent on parties

to arbitral proceedings to accept and carry out the award in good Laith. The only
difference between arbitration and [judicial settlement] lies in the method ol' selecting
the members of these judicial organs. While, in arbitration proceedings, this is done
by agreement between the parties, judicial settlement presupposes the existence of a
standing tribunal with its own bench of judges and its own rules of procedure which
parties to a dispute must accept.
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States Parties to [its] Statute. , 303 Although Canada and the United
States are parties to the ICJ's Statute neither can be required to
come before the court. Article 36(1) of the Statute states: "The
jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer
to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations or in treaties or conventions in force. ' 30 4 Thus,
only if the United States agrees to take a Garrison Diversion
problem to the ICJ will Canada be able to use it to test the United
States' compliance with substantive and procedural international
environmental law. Furthermore, there is neither a treaty in force
between these two nations, nor anything in the Charter, that would
give the ICJ jurisdiction over a Garrison Diversion environmental
problem. Article 36(2) of the Statute states that parties to it can
declare "that they recognize as compulsory 'ipso facto' and without
special agreement

.

.

.

the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal

disputes .... ",305 Although the United States has made a
declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction under this clause it
included an important reservation in doing so. The United States
declaration does not apply to "disputes with regard to matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States of America as determined by the United States of
America .
,306 By this "self-judging" reservation America has
"...
in fact not committed itself to compulsory jurisdiction, but has
reserved to itself the right to choose which cases it will have decided
by the ICJ. Taking a Garrison Diversion dispute before an
arbitration tribunal is also wholly dependent upon America's
consent.

307

Clearly then, the international law of compulsory adjudication
and sanctions is primitive compared to that of municipal systems of
law. What is likely to happen? If Canadian waters are harmed by
foreign biota because of GDU, how will the consequential dispute
be settled?
It is certainly possible that the United States will agree to the
ICJ's jurisdiction of the matter and, if so, it would surely abide by
the final decision. Importantly, the United States has consented to
the ICJ's jurisdiction in another continuing disagreement with
Id.
303. BASIC DocuMENTS,sUpra mote 59, at :396.

304. Id.
305. Id.
306. INT'I COURT OF JUSTICE, YEARBOOK 1982-1983, at 88 (1983).
307. Although the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty gives le I nternlional

(:ommission dhe
CJint
responsibility to examine and report upon issues submitted to it,its dletcrinialions are not Iinding,
only advisory. Furthermore, it has not been lie practice of Canada and lie United Staies Io
unilaterally refer matters to the Commission but only to use it upon agrecment.
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Canada. The two states have asked the ICJ to decide the course of
the maritime boundary that divides their continental shelves and
fisheries zones in the Gulf of Maine. 30 8 It is more likely, however,
that a Garrison Diversion dispute will be decided by an arbitration
tribunal. The United States has participated in hundreds of
arbitrations in its dealings with other countries. The Trail Smelter
and Gut Dam disputes, for example, were resolved in this manner.
Arbitration is favored by states over the ICJ because they have
greater control over the composition of an arbitration tribunal, its
procedures, and the legal principles it is to apply.
It is probable that the United States will settle any future
problem over GDU by one of the methods discussed above. It is
doubtful that the dispute would be allowed to fester. The United
States has to live with its northern neighbor; the fact that they share
the continent requires them to deal continually with one another.
Failure to resolve a Garrison Diversion dispute would inimically
affect Canadian-United States relations regarding such problems as
acid rain, the division of sea resources, and pollution of the Great
Lakes. Such failure would also adversely affect their overall
relations in a world of interdependent states. The United States
aspires to achieve a reputation as a trustworthy and law abiding
country and to maintain this reputation, which also leads one to
believe that it would not object to some form of third party
settlement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States' recent record regarding disputes with
Canada is mixed. On the one hand, it recognized and responsibly
addressed the dispute with Canada over the Gulf of Maine; on the
other hand, it largely ignored Canadian protests that air pollution
from American industries is destroying Canadian wildlife, lakes,
ar.d forests. Therefore, the will of the United States to adhere to
international law is being tested in its handling of North Dakota's
Garrison Diversion project. Eyes will focus on how a mighty
country handles the bitter pill of economic loss occasioned by the
cry for justice of a weaker country. Will the United States continue
its apparent respect for procedural internatioral law? If Canadian
waters are damaged by Garrison Diversion, will the United States
reaction be as deferential to its legal duties as Canada's was in the
Gut Dam and Trail Smelter disputes?
308.

YEARBOOK,

supra note 306, at 123.
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Clearly, the Garrison Diversion project has matured into a
confrontation that will occupy a far more dramatic place in
Canadian-United States relations and diplomacy, as well as in legal
history, than was first envisioned. The true character of the United
States as a world citizen will be cast in the style and substance of its
management and resolution of the Garrision Diversion dispute.

